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PETITIONING A COURT TO MODIFY ALIMONY WHEN
A CLIENT RETIRES
I. INTRODUCTION
The belief that marriage is a lifelong union is fast becoming an
antiquated notion as approximately fifty percent of all marriages
end in divorce. l Accordingly, the area of family law has expanded to
encompass the ever-changing situations of divorcing couples,2 varying moral standards, and a society loathe to address the emotional
and economic fallout produced by divorce. 3 As a result of the many
1.

2.

3.

See Susan Hager, Comment, Nostalgic Attempts to Recapture What Neuer Was: Louisianas Covenant Marriage Act, 77 NEB. L. REv. 567, 567 (1998); see also HUGH
CARTER & PAUL C. GLICK, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE: A SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC

STUDY 28 (1976). However, the assumption that the weakening of marital
bonds is a product of the changing family ideals of the twentieth century is
not completely accurate. See JACQUELINE D. STANLEY. DIVORCES FROM HELL 11
(1995). In the seventeenth century, King Henry VIII of England established a
new religion to obtain a divorce from his first wife, Catherine of Aragon. See
id. at 19. In addition, Abraham Lincoln handled divorce cases as a routine
part of his law practice before becoming President of the United States. See ill.
at 70. In one particular case, Lincoln was believed to have carried his client
into the courtroom on his shoulders, declaring: "Unless my client gets both
mules and the good pitchfork, all the thunder of the heavens will descend
upon you in a manner that no human being has ever been witnessed to." Id.
See generaUy WALTER O. WEYRAUCH & SANFORD N. KATZ. AMERICAN FAMILY LAw IN
TRANsmON (1983) (providing an in-depth perspective on the theory of family
law).
The new burden on society is incited largely by the intense chain of events
preceding divorce and the resulting adverse impact on the parties involved.
See Paul Bohannan, The Six Stations of Divorce, in READINGS IN FAMILY LAw: DIVORCE AND ITS CoNSEQUENCES 4 (Frederica K. Lombard ed., 1990). According
to Bohannan, there are six stages of divorce that transpire simultaneously and
complicate the daily social routines of couples. See ill. These six overlapping
experiences are:
(1) the emotional divorce, which centers around the problem of the
deteriora-ting marriage; (2) the legal divorce, based on grounds; (3)
. the economic divorce, which deals with money and property; (4) the
coparental divorce, which deals with custody, single-parent homes,
and visitation; (5) the community divorce, surrounding the changes
of friends and community that every divorcee experiences; and (6)
the psychic divorce, with the problem of regaining individual
autonomy.
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distinctions in family morals and values, divorce-" [t] he legal separation of man and wife, effected by the judgment or decree of a
court,"4--can no longer be considered a simple legal matter.
One aspect of divorce proceedings that has been the subject of
much debate and discussion is alimony.5 Specifically, the issue of
terminating or modifying an alimony award has become the subject
of scrutiny in numerous jurisdictions.6 The focus of this Comment is
on modifying alimony awards in Maryland.
Initially, this Comment addresses the historical development of
alimony in Maryland by examining its origin from the practices of

4.
5.

6.

[d. at 4-5.
LAw

DICTIONARY 480 (6th ed. 1990).
See Robert F. Kelly & Greer Litton Foxh, Determinants of Alimony Awards: An Empirical Test of Certain Theories and a Reflection of Public Policy, 44 SYRACUSE L REv.
641, 642-43 (1993) (questioning the lack of scholarly literature addressing alimony, despite recent legal discussion); John C. Sheldon, The Sleepwalker's TOUT
of Divorr:e Law, 48 ME. L REv. 7, 26 n.56 (1996) (listing recent scholarly discussions underlying a "furious and nation-wide debate" of alimony). Alimony is
derived from the Latin word alimonia, which means sustenance and it typically
defined as a "court-ordered allowance one spouse pays to support his or her
estranged spouse." Me First, 8 FAM. Anvoc. 3, 3 (1986). When alimony was first
awarded by the English ecclesiastical courts, the husband was ordered to make
support payments to the wife, but the parties actually remained married during the course of their lives. See Ira Mark Ellman, The Theory of Alimony, 77
CAL. L REv. 3, 5 (1989).
See infra Parts III and IV for a general discussion of decisions affecting the
post-separation termination or inodiflc;nion of alimony.
The distinction between the terms "alimony" and "spousal support" is relatively unimportant in Maryland today. The traditional definition of alimony involved a court order demanding payments from a husband to a wife to continue as long as they live separate and apart, and for the joint lives of the
parties. See Mendelson v. Mendelson, 75 Md. App. 486, 496, 541 A.2d 1331,
1336 (1988). Violation of this order could subject the non<ompliant party to
contempt and the accompanying possibility of jail time or other sanctions. See
id. at 497,541 A.2d at 1336. Spousal support, on the other hand, was traditionally viewed as a creature of contract, which a court could not grant but for an
agreement of some sort between the parties. See id. Non<ompliance with
agreements of this sort had typically subjected the party only to civil penalties
for breach of contract. See id. The distinction has historically been of consequence because courts that found that an element of technical alimony was
missing from a factual situation, even though the parties intended for the payments to constitute alimony, would nonetheless have been required to treat
the payments as being pursuant to an agreement of spousal support, and thus
not enforceable or modifiable by the courts. See id. at 497, 541 A.2d at
1336-37.
BLACK'S
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the English ecclesiastical courts in the eighteenth century' to its
present treatment. 8 The historical development includes a brief discussion of the purpose of alimony,9 the three categories of alimony
that Maryland courts are presently authorized to grant,IO and the essential elements required for an award under each. II Parts Three
and Four of this Comment explain the circumstances that permit
courts to modify alimony awards,12 as well as the rare situations that
have been found sufficient to terminate alimony.13 One of the most
common situations in which a court will modify an alimony award is
when a payor spouse retires. 14 To that end, a major focus of this
Comment is a comparative analysis of various jurisdiction's treatment of retirement as it relates to modifying alimony.
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF ALIMONY IN MARYLAND
In England, prior to the eighteenth century, the ecclesiastical
courts did not have the power. to completely dissolve a marriage by
granting an absolute divorce. 15 However, the ecclesiastical courts did
have the power to order a legal separation of a couple through a
limited divorce. I.6 The ecclesiastical courts had the authority to grant
7.

8.

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

15.

16.

For a general overview of the historical development of alimony, see Chester
G. Vernier & John B. Hurlbut, The Historical Background of Alimony Law and its
Present Statutory Strnctu1l1, 6 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 197 (1939); infra notes
15-36 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Horsey v. Horsey, 329 Md. 392,410, 620 A.2d 305, 314-15 (1993) ("'AIimony' in a legal sense (often referred to as 'technical alimony') is a periodic
allowance for spousal support, payable under judicial decree, which terminates
upon the death of either spouse or upon the remarriage of the spouse receiving the payments or upon the reconciliation and cohabitation of the parties.").
See infra notes 41-60 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 61-80 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 61-80 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 81-257 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 258-82 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 81-257 and accompanying text.
See Thomas v. Thomas, 294 Md. 605, 609-10, 451 A.2d 1215,1217 (1982) (footnote omitted). An absolute divorce, often referred to as "a vinculo matrimonii"-from the bed of matrimony-is a type of divorce that results in a
complete dissolution of the marriage contract. BlACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 136
(6th ed. 1990); see also MD. CODE ANN .. FAM. LAw § 7-103 (1998) (providing the
grounds for an absolute divorce in Maryland).
A limited divorce is a "judicial separation of husband and wife not dissolving
the marriage." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 927 (6th ed. 1990); see also MD. CODE
ANN .. FAM. lAw § 7-102 (providing the grounds for a limited divorce in Mary-
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alimony, but only to the wife and only when a limited divorce was
granted. 17 Thus, the ecclesiastical courts could not grant alimony to
a wife that sought support if she was not divorcing her husband. IS
In Maryland, ecclesiastical courts did not exist. 19 Parties seeking
to dissolve their marriage could not get relief from Maryland's judiciary because divorce "was deemed exclusively a legislative function. "20 Thus, the General Assembly retained exclusive authority to
grant divorces in Maryland. 21 Though the ecclesiastical alimony doctrine that limited the circumstances in which a court could grant an
alimony award was adopted through decisional law in many jurisdictions,22 it was not fully embraced by Maryland COUrts.23 Instead, Maryland equity courts assumed broader inherent authority and
granted alimony to wives that received a limited divorce through
the legislature, as weU as to wives that did not even seek a divorce. 24
In 1777, in an apparent attempt to restrict this inherent power,
"the General Assembly authorized equity courts to hear and determine alimony causes in the same manner" as the English ecclesiastiland).
17.
18.
19.
20.

21.
22.
23.

24.

Thomas, 294 Md. at 609-10,451 A2d at 1217.
McAlear v. McAlear, 298 Md. 320, 327, 469 A2d 1256, 1259 (1984).
Thomas, 294 Md. at 610, 451 A.2d at 1217.
(citing Crane v. Meginnis, 1 G. & J. 463, 474 (1829»; see also McAlear, 298
Md. at 327, 469 A.2d at 1259 (observing that "[d]ivorce in Maryland is a statutory creation that was unknown to the common law"); Bender v. Bender, 282
Md. 525,529, 386 A2d 772, 775 (1978); Altman v. Altman, 282 Md. 483, 490,
386 A2d 766, 770 (1978); Emerson v. Emerson, 120 Md. 584, 589, 87 A 1033,
1035 (1913).
See McAlear, 298 Md. at 328, 469 A2d at 1259.
See Courson v. Courson, 213 Md. 183, 185, 129 A2d 917, 918 (1957).
See Thomas, 294 Md. at 610, 451 A2d at 1217; Courson, 213 Md. at 185, 129
A2d at 918. Several other cases have examined the history of divorce and alimony in England and in Maryland. See, e.g., Bender, 282 Md. at 529-31, 386
A2d at 775-77; Altman, 282 Md. at 490-91,386 A2d at 770-71; Foote v. Foote,
190 Md. 171, 176-80, 57 A2d 804, 807-09 (1948).
See McAlear, 298 Md. at 328, 469 A2d at 1260 (citing Galwith v. Galwith, 4 H. &
McH. 477, 478 (1689»; Emerson, 120 Md. at 590, 87 A at 1035-36 (noting that
the "right" to alimony "was founded on the common-law obligation of the
husband to support his wife").
For example, in Galwith v. Galwith, 4 H. & McH. 477 (1689), scandalous
rumors arose about Mrs. Galwith; her husband evicted her and their child
from the family's home. See id. Mrs. Galwith did not seek a divorce decree, but
instead sought an order requiring her husband to pay her maintenance if he
was not ordered to allow her back into the home. See id. at 477-78. The court
ordered Mr. Galwith to provide a specified amount of his tobacco crop each
year if he did not allow her to move back into the family's home. See id.
See
See
See
Id.

1998]

Petitioning to Modify Alimony

197

cal courts.2S Nevertheless, courts construed this statute "as merely
confirming the previously existing inherent authority of Maryland
equity courts over alimony."26 Thus, Maryland courts continued to
grant alimony awards to wives without requiring a limited divorce. 27
Although Maryland courts took greater liberties in awarding alimony than their ecclesiastical counterparts, Maryland courts still
viewed alimony as a right incident to marriage. 28 Inasmuch as a limited divorce did not sever the parties' marital bond,29 Maryland
courts would only grant alimony "to be paid during the term of the
marriage. "30
A major change occurred in 1841, when the General Assembly
greatly expanded the power of the courts to grant alimony after the
marriage was terminated. 31 Maryland equity courts were empowered
by the General Assembly to grant both limited and absolute divorces, along with the authority to grant an award of alimony to the
wife in either type of divorce proceeding. 32 This power was subsequently codified in sections 24 and 25 of Article 16 of the Maryland
Annotated Code. 33 In 1975, the General Assembly broadened the judicial power to grant alimony.34 Article 16, section 1(a) "authorized
equity courts . . . to award alimony to either spouse."3S Further25. McAlear, 298 Md. at 328, 469 A.2d at 1260. Alimony awards
to the wife. See id.
26.

wer~

only granted

[d.

27. See, e.g., Galwith, 4 H. & McH. at 478.
28. SeeJOHN F. FADER, II & RICHARD J. GILBERT, MARYlAND FAMILY lAw § 4-1(c), at
116 (2d ed. 1995).
29. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
30. See FADER & GILBERT, supra note 28, § 4-1 (c), at 116.
31. See id.
32. See Thomas v. Thomas, 294 Md. 605, 609-14, 451 A.2d 1215, 1217-20 (citing MD.
ANN. CoDE art. 16, §§ 24 and 25 (1957»; see also Mendelson v. Mendelson, 75
Md. App. 486, 495, 541 A.2d 1331, 1336 (1988) ("[T]he traditional definition
of alimony was court ordered payments to a wife . . . . "); Bebermeyer v.
Bebermeyer, 241 Md. 72, 76-77, 215 A.2d 463, 466 (1965); Blades v. Szatai, 151
Md. 644, 648, 135 A. 841, 843 (1927); Hood v. Hood, 138 Md. 355, 360, 113 A.
895, 897 (1921); Newbold v. Newbold, 133 Md. 170, 174-75, 104 A. 366, 367
(1918); McCaddin v. McCaddin, 116 Md. 567, 571, 82 A 554, 556 (1911); Wallingsford v. Wallingsford, 6 H & J 485, 488 (1825).
33. See McAlear v. McAlear, 298 Md. 320, 330, 469 A.2d 1256, 1261 (1984).
34. See id. The code sections, which provided an amended and expanded version
of the statute, were repealed in 1984. See MD. ANN. CoDE art. 16, §§ 1-5 (1982).
35. McAlear, 298 Md. at 330, 469 A.2d at 1261. While article 16 broadened the
power of a court to award alimony, it somewhat restricted the court's discretion by requiring courts to consider "an enumerated set of factors" before
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more, section 5(a) "confirmed the authority of equity courts to
modify the amount of alimony awarded. "36
Maryland's current alimony statute 37 was enacted by the General Assembly in 1980.38 Courts are now supplied with a multi-factor
framework to use in determining the amount and duration of an alimony award. 39 When a party seeks to modify an alimony award by
either extending the payment period or adjusting the amount of
the award, section 11-107 of the Family Law Article sets forth standards that the party seeking relief must meet. 40 The next section of
this Comment demonstrates that these statutory provisions represent a philosophical departure from prior approaches to alimony.
A. The Purpose of Alimony

The fundamental purpose of alimony has been the subject of
considerable debate. 41 Maryland alimony payments were initially
awarded on an indefinite basis, allowing the husband and wife to
live separate and apart without eliminating the husband's obligation
to support his wife. 42 In essence, alimony represented a continuation of the socioeconomic aspect of the legal bond of marriage for
the duration of the couple's joint lives. 43 Alimony awards embodied
both the continuing legal duty of a husband to support his wife and
the lack of employment opportunity for women. 44
rendering an award. ld.
36. ld.
37. See MD. CoDE ANN., FAM. LAw §§ 11-101 to 11-111 (1998) (originaJly codified as
MD. ANN. CODE art. 16 §§ 1, 2, 3, 5 (Supp. 1980».
38. See Blaine v. Blaine, 336 Md. 49, 63, 646 A.2d 413, 420 (1994).
39. See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 11-106 (1998).
40. See ilL § 11-107.
41. See HOMER H. ClARK. JR.. THE LAw OF DOMESTIC RElATIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES § 14.1, at 421 (1968). For example, a few articulated purposes of alimony include continuing the support that the financially dependant spouse
was entitled to receive while the marriage was in existence, punishment for
the payor spouse's transgressions, and damages for wrongful breach of the
marriage contract. See ill. at 421-22.
42. See Knabe v. Knabe, 176 Md. 606, 611, 6 A.2d 366, 369 (1939).
43. See Dougherty v. Dougherty, 187 Md. 21, 32,48 A2d 451, 457 (1946); Michael
D. Smith, Note, The Duration of the Alimony Obligation in Wyoming: Longer Than
We Both ShaU Liver Oedekoven v. Oedekoven, 920 P.2d 649 (Wyo. 1996), 33
LAND & WATER L. REv. 383, 384-85 (1998) (citing HOMER H. ClARK. JR.. THE
LAw OF DOMESTIC RElATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES. § 16.1, at 619 (2d ed. abr.
1988».
44. See Smith, supra note 43, at 384-85 (1998) (citing ClARK. supra note 43, § 16.1,
at 619).
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As time passed, however, alimony award amounts were increasingly based on the wife's level of need, the standard of living established during the course of the marriage,45 and the assumption that
the wife would not become self-sufficient. 46 Although these considerations increasingly shaped the amount of alimony awarded, courts
continued to provide indefinite, periodic support for the financially
dependent wife following the divorce without encouraging her to
become self-sufficient in the future. 47
For example, in Dougherty v. Dougherty,48 a wife appealed a divorce decree that denied her request for alimony on the grounds of
abandonment. 49 The Court of Appeals of Maryland emphasized that
in applying for alimony, a wife was not "asking for favors but demanding rights. "50 The court found that the wife was entitled to alimony based on the husband and wife's financial circumstances, sta45.

46.
47.

48.
49.

50.

See Timanus v. Timanus, 178 Md. 640, 642-43, 16 A.2d 918, 920 (1940). In
Timanus, the wife was living with a married daughter at the time of the hearing, paying five dollars per week for rent and sleeping in the living room on a
cot. See id. at 642, 16 A.2d at 919. Her former husband, an attorney, lived
alone in an eight-bedroom house. See id. at 643, 16 A.2d at 920. The court
concluded, based on a comparison of the former couple's situation, that the
wife was entitled to demand support from her husband under the applicable
law. See id. The court looked at the parties' standard of living and affirmed the
award of alimony to the wife based largely in part on the wife's need and the
husband's earning capacity. See id. at 644, 16 A.2d at 920.
See Linda D. Elrod, The Widening Door of Alimony, 8 FAM. ADVOCATE, 4, 4-5
(1986).
See infra notes 48-52 and accompanying text. Traditionally, alimony has been
regarded as "a money allowance payable under a judicial decree by a husband
at stated intervals to his wife, or former wife, during their joint lives or until
the remarriage of the wife, so long as they live separately, for her support and
maintenance." Knabe, 176 Md. at 612,6 A.2d at 368-69.
187 Md. 21, 48 A.2d 451 (1946).
See id. at 25, 48 A.2d at 454. At trial, the husband established that his wife's
adulterous relationships had led to their divorce. See id. at 28, 48 A.2d at 455.
ld. at 33, 48 A.2d at 457; cf. Condore v. Prince George's County, 289 Md. 516,
520, 425 A.2d 1011, 1013 (1981) (citing Ewell v. State, 207 Md. 288, 114 A.2d
66 (1955); Coastal Tank Lines, Inc. v. Canoles, 207 Md. 37, 113, 521 A.2d 82
(1955); Stonesifer v. Shriver, 100 Md. 24, 59 A. 139 (1904» ("Under the common law of Maryland, prior to the adoption of ERA, the husband had a legal
duty to supply his wife with necessaries suitable to their station in life, but the
wife had no corresponding obligation to support her husband, or supply him
with necessaries, even if she had the financial means to do so."). Alimony also
proved to be a valuable tool for an ex-husband who wished to control his former wife's behavior after the dissolution of the marriage. See Jana B. Singer,
DWorce Refurm and Gender Justice, 67 N.C. L. REv. 1103, 1109-10 (1989).
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tion in life, age, physical condition, ability to work, length of time
together, circumstances leading to their separation, and the husband's earning capacity.51 Although the Dougherty court discussed a
variety of factors that Maryland courts were just beginning to develop, the opinion remained true to the prevailing view that the primary purpose of alimony was for the wife's "support during the
joint lives of the parties as long as they [remained] separated. "52
Mod~rn courts began to de-emphasize the idea that alimony
was an entitlement by shifting to the rationale that the purpose of
alimony should be to rehabilitate the wife so that she may ultimately become self-sufficient.53 Consistent with this rehabilitative
purpose, alimony evolved to encompass gender neutral54 support
obligations that are awarded for a pre-determined period of time. 55
Nevertheless, the financial independence that rehabilitative alimony56 is designed to provide may be difficult to take advantage of
when a dependent spouse is left alone with children and is forced
to become self-sufficient while struggling to care for the familyY
51. See Dougherty, 187 Md. at 33, 48 A.2d at 457.
52. Id. at 32, 48 A.2d at 457 ("Under the law of this State no allowance to a wife is
considered as alimony which does anything more than provide for the payment of money at stated periods for her support during the joint lives of the
parties as long as they are separated.").
53. See Holston v. Holston, 58 Md. App. 308, 321, 473 A.2d 459, 465 (1984). The
main purpose of alimony is "to rehabilitate the dependant spouse so she or
he may become economically self-5ufficient." Rogers v. Rogers, 80 Md. App.
575, 591, 565 A.2d 361, 369 (1989) (citations omitted); see also Quigley v.
Quigley, 54 Md. App. 45, 54, 456 A.2d 1305, 1311 (1983) (noting that the Governor's Commission report clearly stated that the primary purpose of alimony
was to provide the recipient with the opportunity to become self-5ufficient),
uverruled on other grounds, Parker v. Robins, 68 Md. App. 597, 514 A.2d 1237
(1986).
54. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
55. See FADER & GILBERT. supra note 28, § 4-3, at 119.
56. Rehabilitative alimony is defined as "sums necessary to assist a divorced person
in regaining a useful and constructive role in society through vocational or
therapeutic training or retraining and for the further purpose of preventing
financial hardship on society or [the] individual during the rehabilitative process." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1287 (6th ed. 1990) (citing Sever v. Sever, 467
So. 2d 492, 494 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985».
57. See generaUy RlANE TENNENHAUS EISLER, DISSOLUTION: No FAULT DIVORCE. MAR.
RlAGE. AND THE FUTURE OF WOMEN 54 (1977). Data indicative of the first year
after divorce has shown that men enjoy a 42% increase in their standard of
living, while women and children suffer a 73% decline. See Cynthia Starnes,
Divorce and the Displaced Homemaker. A Discourse on Playing with Dolls, Partnership
Buyouts and Dissociation Under NtrFault, 60 U. CHI. L. REv. 67. 79 (1993) (citing

1998]

Petitioning to Modify Alimony

201

While Maryland courts are still permitted to grant indefinite ali·
mony awards,s8 the state has recognized and accepted rehabilitation
as alimony's primary purpose,S9 replacing the traditional belief that
LENORE]' WEITZMAN. THE DIVORCE REvOLUTION 323 (1985». Starnes provided a
concise overview of the situation as it existed a few years ago, declaring that
"[w]hen a woman whose principal job has been homemaking loses her occu·
pation and her patriarch, she faces a sea-change in both income and status."
Id. at 78.
58. See Tracey v. Tracey, 328 Md. 380, 393-94, 614 A2d 590, 596-97 (1992) (hold·
ing that a gross disparity existed when recipient's income was 28% of the
payor's and that recipient would not automatically forfeit her right to alimony
should she engage in additional part-time work), cere. granted, 325 Md. 551,
60 1 A.2d 1114 (1992), rescinded on other grounds, 328 Md. 380, 614 A2d 590
(1992); Blaine v. Blaine, 97 Md. App. 689, 708, 632 A2d 191, 201 (1993) (finding that because the recipient spouse's income was equal to 22.7% of the
payor's income, it was sufficient to support an award of indefinite alimony);
Rock v. Rock, 86 Md. App. 598, 609-11, 587 A2d 1133, 1138 (1991) (deferring
to the lower court's decision to award indefinite alimony based on the fact
that the recipient spouse did not have the skills or professional opportunities
to earn more than 21.7% of the payor spouse's income); Broseus v. Broseus,
82 Md. App. 183, 196, 570 A.2d 874, 880-81 (1990) (upholding the lower
court's grant of indefinite alimony to recipient spouse whose earnings were
equal to 34.9% of the payor spouse); Rogers, 80 Md. App. at 591-92, 565 A2d
at 369-70 (noting that a gross disparity in income existed when the payor
spouse's annual income exceeded $100,000 and the payee, a full-time student
whose income was pure conjecture, had never earned more than $17,500);
Bricker v. Bricker, 78 Md. App. 570, 577, 554 A2d 444, 447 (1988) (finding
that even when the recipient spouse maximized her income by working excessive hours, the recipient'S income was only 35% of that earned by the payor
spouse and therefore, finding an award of indefinite alimony proper); Holston,
58 Md. App. at 322-23, 473 A2d at 466 (observing that even if the recipient
spouse were able to re-enter the job market after 15 years, her earnings would
be less than 15% of the payor spouse's); Kennedy v. Kennedy, 55 Md. App.
299, 306-07, 462 A2d 1208, 1214 (1983) (upholding the trial court's finding
that 34% difference in incomes resulted in unconscionably disparate standards
of living, justifying an indefinite alimony award); see also Strauss v. Strauss, 101
Md. App. 490, 512, 647 A2d 818, 829 (1994) (holding that the trial court
abused its discretion in only basing the award of indefinite alimony on the recipient spouse's "expressed needs and her ability to meet those needs" with·
out considering the parties' respective lifestyles); Melrod v. Melrod, 83 Md.
App. 180, 195-97, 574 A.2d 1, 8-9 (1990) (finding that despite a short mar·
riage, the disparity in income was so great that an award of indefinite alimony
was not an abuse of discretion).
59. See Doser v. Doser, 106 Md. App. 329, 352, 664 A2d 453, 464 (1995) (empha·
sizing that fixed·term rehabilitative alimony, is "clearly preferred to indefinite
alimony"); see also Tracey, 328 Md. at 391, 614 A2d at 596 (observing that the
statutory scheme generally favors fixed-term or rehabilitative alimony which
provides an opportunity for the recipient spouse to become self-supporting);

202

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 28

alimony was to serve as a "lifetime pension. "60
B. Categories oj Alimony in Maryland
Maryland courts are now vested with the power to grant awards
of alimony.61 Under section 11-101 (c) of the Maryland Family Law
Rock, 86 Md. App. at 609, 587 A.2d at 1138 (justifying the award of indefinite
alimony because rehabilitative spousal support for a limited time would result
in a gross inequity); Blake v. Blake, 81 Md. App. 712, 727, 596 A2d 724, 731
(1990) (noting that although rehabilitative alimony has become the preferred
legislative award, the trial judge was we\l suited to determine whether, given
the time necessary to achieve further education or training, a 57 year-old
spouse would be able to become self-supporting or was statutorily qualified to
receive indefinite alimony); EWgers, 80 Md. App. at 591, 565 A.2d at 369 (declaring that the primary purpose of alimony is to be rehabilitative, as opposed
to punitive or compensatory, so that the dependent spouse can become financia\ly independent); Bricker, 78 Md. App. at 580, 554 A2d at 449 (observing
that the statutory preference for rehabilitative alimony dates back to a recommendation by the Governor's Commission on Domestic Relations Laws); Turrisi v. Sanzaro, 308 Md. 515, 530, 520 A.2d 1080, 1087-88 (1987) (acknowledging that while the General Assembly has embraced the concept of
rehabilitative alimony, a trial court may reserve the right to award alimony in
a case when one spouse was suffering from multiple sclerosis, even though
that spouse was presently self-supporting); Rosenberg v. Rosenberg, 64 Md.
App. 487, 536,497 A2d 485, 510 (1984) (concluding that although the principal function of alimony is rehabilitation, the lower court could find that the
recipient spouse would never become sufficiently self-supporting to a\low her
to continue the lifestyle she shared with her husband of thirty years). But cJ.
Covie\lo v. Covie\lo, 91 Md. App. 638, 652, 605 A2d 661, 668 (1992) (noting
that if supported by the evidence, and within the purposes of the statute, simultaneous awards of rehabilitative and indefinite alimony are permissible).
60. Holston, 58 Md. App. at 321, 473 A2d at 465-66. In Holston, the court of special appeals noted:
[T]he concept of alimony as a lifetime pension enabling the financia\ly dependent spouse to maintain an accustomed standard of living has largely been superseded by the concept that the economica\ly
dependent spouse should be required to become self-supporting,
even though that might result in a reduced standard of living.
[d. (citing the Governor's Commission on Domestic Relations Laws, Report on
a Proposal Bill Relating to Alimony and Comment on a Proposed Bill Relating
to the Decriminalization of Non-support, Beverly Anne Grover, Chairman, Jan.
18, 1980). More recently, the court of special appeals reiterated this standard
in Jensen v. Jensen, 103 Md. App. 678, 692-93, 654 A2d 914, 921 (1995) and
Campolattaro v. Campolattaro, 66 Md. App. 68, 75, 502 A2d 1068, 1072 (1986).
For an enlightening discussion of alimony awards, see Charles J. Aldrich,
Comment, The Spousal Support Scheme in Ohio Under 3105:18: Trial Courts Have
Too Much Judicial Discretion, 22 OHIO N.V. L REv. 815 (1996).
61. See MD. CODE ANN .• FAM. LAw § 1-20l(a)(2) (1998).

1998]

Petitioning to Modify Alimony

203

Article, an alimony award may be granted to an individual who is
entitled to an annulment,62 limited divorce,63 or absolute divorce. 64
There are three categories of alimony that may be awarded in Maryland: (1) temporary alimony,65 (2) statutory alimony,66 and (3)indef62.

63.
64.

65.

66.

See id. § 11-101 (a)(2)(i) "An 'annulment' differs from a divorce in that a divorce terminates a legal status, whereas an annulment establishes that a marital status never existed." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 91 (6th ed. 1990) (citing
Whealton v. Whealton, 432 P.2d 979 (Cal. 1967».
See MD. CODE ANN .. FAM. LAw § 11-101 (a)(2)(ii).
See id. § 11-101 (a)(2)(iii).
See id. § 11-102. Temporary alimony, or alimony pendente lite, is a form of alimony intended to temporarily stabilize the financial situation of a dependant
spouse through the preliminary steps of a divorce proceeding. See Guarino v.
Guarino, 112 Md. App. I, 10,684 A.2d 23, 27-28 (1996) (citing Speropulos v.
Speropulos, 97 Md. App. 613, 617, 631 A.2d 514,516 (1993». Alimony pendente
lite is defined as "[a]n allowance made pending a suit for divorce or separate
maintenance including a reasonable allowance for preparation of the suit as
well as for support." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 47 (6th ed. 1990).
Underlying statutory alimony is the legislative intent to "change the focus of
alimony from a form of lifetime pension toward a 'bridge' to self-sufficiency."
Jensen v. Jensen, 103 Md. App. 678, 693, 654 A.2d 914, 921 (1994); see also
FADER & GILBERT, supra note 28, § 4-7, at 142 (referring to alimony awarded
under MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 11-106(b) as "statutory alimony"). Section
11-106(b) of the Maryland Family Law Article provides the following twelve
factors for a court to. consider in determining the amount of an alimony
award:
(I) the ability of the party seeking alimony to be wholly or partly self
supporting; (2) the time necessary for the party seeking alimony to
gain sufficient education or training to enable that party to find suitable employment; (3) the standard of living that the parties established during their marriage; (4) the duration of the marriage; (5)
the contributions, monetary and nonmonetary, of each party to the
well-being of the family; (6) the circumstances that contributed to
the estrangement of the parties; (7) the age of each party; (8) the
physical and mental condition of each party; (9) the ability of the
party from whom alimony is sought to meet that party's needs while
meeting the needs of the party seeking alimony; (10) any agreement
between the parties; (II) the financial needs and financial resources
of each party, including: (i) all income and assets, including property
that does not produce income; (ii) any award made under §§ 8-205
and 8-208 of this article; (iii) the nature and amount of the financial
obligations of each party; and (iv) the right of each party to receive
retirement benefits; and (12) whether the award would cause a
spouse who is a resident of a related institution as defined in § 19301 of the Health-General Article and from whom alimony is sought
to become eligible for medical assistance earlier than would otherwise occur.
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inite alimony.67
MD. CODE ANN .. FAM. LAw § 11-106(b). Maryland courts have applied these factors in a number of cases. See, e.g., Tracey v. Tracey, 328 Md. 380, 387-90, 614
A2d 590, 594-96 (1992) (holding that income includes wages or salary from
regular, full-time employment, not income from a second job), cm. granted,
325 Md. 551, 601 A.2d 1114 (1992), rescinded on other grounds, 328 Md. 380, 614
A2d 590 (1992); Rock v. Rock, 86 Md. App. 598, 605, 587 A2d 1133, 1137
(1991) (acknowledging that the Legislature made the circumstances contributing to the estrangement a factor in granting alimony in lieu of the relatively
modern common law doctrine which precluded spousal support where the
one seeking support was at fault); Alston v. Alston, 85 Md. App. 176, 189-90,
582 A2d 574, 58~81 (1990) (affirming the trial court's finding that the recipient's non-economic contributions, such as taking care of the children, preparing meals, and maintaining a clean home, far exceeded the payor's contributions), mJ'd on other grounds, 331 Md. 496, 629 A.2d 70 (1991); Blake v. Blake,
81 Md. App. 712, 728-29, 569 A2d 724, 732 (1990) (finding that the trial
judge was well suited to permit indefinite alimony when the evidence showed
that the 57-year-old recipient spouse had a difficult time getting her present
job and did not think that, given her age, she would return to school or be
able to compete for jobs against younger people); Rogers v. Rogers, 80 Md.
App. 575, 59~92, 565 A.2d 361, 369 (1989) (determining that even if the recipient spouse were to earn a college degree while receiving alimony, there
would be no reason to expect that the respective standard of living of the parties would not be unconscionably disparate); Benkin v. Benkin, 71 Md. App.
191, 203, 524 A.2d 789, 794-95 (1987) (holding that the trial court should
have explained why a women who suffers from a longstanding arthritic condition should not be eligible for indefinite alimony given the difficulty she will
likely experience in attempting to re-enter the job market). However, conditions aside from these factors may affect a court's alimony award. See Reuter v.
Reuter, 102 Md. App. 212, 230-33, 649 A2d 24, 32-34 (1994) (agreeing with
the trial court that the recipient spouse is not required to act contrary to the
best interests of her child in order to be self supporting); Cheryl Lynn Hepfer
& Sherri Beth Ginsburg, Alimony Update, MD. BAR]', Mar./Apr. 1995, at 27,28
("The legislative intent regarding these factors is to cause the courts to focus
on the rehabilitation of the financially dependent spouse rather than simply
to assume that the financially dependent spouse is entitled to indefinite alimony."); Kathryn Lego Arminger, Note, Antenuptial Agreements Waiving Alimony
A1l1 Not Void Per Se: Frey v. Frey, 298 Md. 552, 471 A.2d 705 (1984), 14 U. BALT.
L. REv. 200 (1984) (discussing the validity of antenuptial agreements waiving
alimony).
67. Indefinite alimony, awarded on a case by case basis, is a form of alimony intended to prevent gross disparities in the income levels of the parties that will
never be alleviated. See Tracey v. Tracey, 328 Md. 380, 393, 614 A.2d 590, 597
(1992) (28% disparity), cm. granted, 325 Md. 551, 601 A.2d 1114 (1992), rescinded on other grounds, 328 Md. 380, 614 A.2d 590 (1992); Crabill v. Crabill,
119 Md. App. 249,266-67, 704 A2d 532, 54~1 (1998); Caldwell v. Caldwell,
103 Md. App 452,464, 653 A2d 994, 1000 (1995) (43% disparity); Blaine v.
Blaine, 97 Md. App. 689, 708, 632 A2d 191, 200 (1993) (23% disparity). See
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Temporary alimony, or alimony pendente lite,68 refers to the type
of alimony a court may grant to provide a spouse with financial suI>"
port in the interim between filing for divorce and final adjudication
of the suit. 69 In order to award temporary alimony, Maryland law requires proof of a marriage, a pending divorce, proof of a financial
need on the part of one party, and the ability to pay on the part of
the other.70 The amount of temporary alimony awarded, however, is
not considered in the subsequent award of statutory alimony.71
Statutory alimony refers to the codification of various factors
Maryland courts must consider in order to award alimony for a
fixed period of time.72 The principal purpose of statutory alimony is
rehabilitation - to provide a recipient spouse with the opportunity
to become financially self-supportive. 73 Before awarding statutory alimony, a trial court must consider the twelve factors set forth in section 11-106(b) of the Family Law Article. 74 While a court is not required to articulate a reason for its decisions regarding each of
these twelve factors, it is required to clearly indicate that it has con-

68.
69.

70.

71.
72.

73.

74.

MD. CODE ANN .. FAM. LAw, § 11-106(c) (1991), which provides:
The court may award alimony for an indefinite period, if the court
finds that: (I) due to age, illness, infirmity or disability, the party
seeking alimony cannot reasonably be expected to make substantial
progress toward becoming self-supporting; or (2) even after the party
seeking alimony will have made as much progress toward becoming
self-supporting as can reasonably be expected, the respective standards of living of the parties will be unconscionably disparate.
[d. (emphasis added).
See FADER & GILBERT, supra note 28, § 4-5, at 133 (citing BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1020 (5th ed. 1979».
See supra note 65.
See FADER & GILBERT, supra note 28, § 4-5(c)-(d), at 135-36. The decision to
offset financial need and ability to pay is "based primarily on considerations
of the reasonable needs of the recipient spouse, balanced against the other
spouse's ability to pay." [d. at 136 (quoting James v. James, 96 Md. App. 439,
450-55,625 A.2d 381, 38fr89 (1993) (citing Maynard v. Maynard, 42 Md. App.
47,51, 399 A.2d 900, 902 (1979»).
See id. at 134 (citing Maynard, 42 Md. App. at 52-53, 399 A.2d at 902-03).
See MD. CoDE ANN .. FAM. LAw, § ll-I06(b)(I)-(12) (1998) (listing twelve factors
a court must consider in awarding alimony). For a recitation of the twelve factors upon which an original grant of alimony is based, see supra note 66.
See Holston v. Holston, 58 Md. App. 308, 321, 473 A.2d 459, 465 (1984) (commenting that the primary function of alimony is rehabilitation) superceded by
statute on other grounds as explored in Quinn v. Quinn, 83 Md. App. 460, 465 n.4,
575 A.2d 764, 766 n.4 (1990). For a discussion of rehabilitation as the primary
purpose of alimony in Maryland, see supra note 59 and accompanying texL
See supra note 66.
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sidered each factor in arriving at the amount awarded. 7s
The third type of alimony granted in Maryland, indefinite alimony, is a monetary payment to a dependent spouse which may
continue indefinitely.76 Indefinite alimony may only be awarded
when, by reason of age or infirmity, a party seeking alimony will
never become self-supportive, or when after becoming selfsupportive, the standard of living between the two divorcing parties
will be "unconscionably disparate."77
With the creation of statutory alimony in 1980, indefinite alimony has become an exception to the norm. 7S While Maryland's
statutory regime for alimony takes a hybrid approach accepting
both the goal of rehabilitation and the idea that certain circumstances call for an indefinite award the rehabilitation rationale has
achieved primacy.79 Nevertheless, alimony awards that extend over
years of the parties' lives persist. so As the parties reach retirement
age, courts have been forced to revisit these indefinite alimony
awards as both the recipient and payor spouse alter their financial
circumstances creating scenarios that may warrant modification of
alimony payments.
75.

76.

77.

78.
79.

80.

See Doser v. Doser, 106 Md. App. 329, 356, 664 A.2d 453, 466-67 (1995) (observing that the court must indicate that all factors were considered in the decision-making process, but formalistic language need not be used with respect
to the decision regarding each factor); Hollander v. Hollander, 89 Md. App.
156, 176, 597 A.2d 1012, 1022 (1991) (noting that the trial judge "is not required to use a formal 'checklist' but may declare an award for alimony in any
way that shows consideration of the necessary factors"); Mount v. Mount, 59
Md. App. 538, 552, 476 A.2d 1175, 1182 (1984) (declaring that the court is required to "consider all relevant factors, including [twelve] specific factors as
required by the Maryland statute").
See MD. CODE ANN .. FAM. LAw § 11-106(c) (1998) ("The court may award alimony for an indefinite period .... "); supra note 62.
MD. CoDE ANN .. FAM. LAw § 11-106(c); see also Rock v. Rock, 86 Md. App. 598,
609, 587 A.2d 1133, 1138 (1991) (noting that indefinite alimony may be
granted when it is impractical to expect a spouse to become self-supportive, or
when alimony for a limited period would result in gross inequity); Rosenberg
v. Rosenberg, 64 Md. App. 487, 531-32, 497 A.2d 485, 507 (1985) (holding that
a wife of 30 years who possesses no specialized skills is unlikely to obtain a
standard of living comparable to the one she enjoyed during marriage and
any temporary alimony award would make the future standard of living of the
parties unconscionably disparate).
See FADER & GILBERT, supra note 28, § 4-8, at 165.
For a discussion of Maryland courts' preference for rehabilitative, rather than
indefinite, alimony awards, see supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 81-257 and accompanying text.
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III. MODIFYING ALIMONY
In Maryland, section 11-107 of the Family Law ArticleS1 permits
a court to modify an alimony award originally granted under section 11-106. 82 A court is authorized to modify an award by either extending the period for which alimony is awarded83 or by modifying
the amount of the award. 84 Either type of modification requires a
change in one or both of the parties' circumstances. 8s
Once an alimony award has been granted, it is critical for the
practitioner to understand the factual circumstances courts have accepted to justify modifying alimony awards. The following section
reviews the standard for modifying alimony in Maryland, changed
circumstances,86 and discusses arguments considered both by Maryland and other state courts.
A. Changed Circumstances
It is well established in Maryland that alimony awards are sub81. See MD. CoDE ANN., FAM. LAw § 11-107. The statute states the following:
(a) Extension of period. - Subject to § 8-103 of this article, the court
may extend the period for which alimony is awarded, if: (1) circumstances arise during the period that would lead to a harsh and inequitable result without an extension; and (2) the recipient petitions
for an extension during the period. (b) Modification of amount. - Subject to § 8-103 of this article and on the petition of either party, the
court may modify the amount of alimony awarded as circumstances
and justice require.
[d.
82. See id.
83. See id. § 11-107(a).
84. See id. § 11-107(b).
85. See Blaine v. Blaine, 336 Md. 49, 64, 646 A2d 413, 420 (1993); see also Brodak v.
Brodak, 294 Md. 10,29,447 A2d 847, 856 (1982); Gamer v. Gamer, 257 Md.
723, 727-28, 264 A2d 858, 860 (1970); Benkin v. Benkin, 71 Md. App. 191,
207-08,524 A2d 789, 797 (1986); Lott v. Lott, 17 Md. App. 440, 444,302 A2d
666, 668 (1973); Verges v. Verges, 13 Md. App. 608, 615, 284 A2d 451, 454
(1971).
86. See MD. CoDE ANN .. FAM. LAw § 11-107(b). Some states, however, have adopted
a much more restrictive standard that must be met before alimony wi\l be
modified. See Scott Bassett, Changing Circumstances, Changing Agreements: Standards f(J'( Modification ani Uniform, but how the Courts Apply Them Varies, 8 FAM.
Aovoc. 29, 29 (1986). For example, Arizona, lIIinois, Kentucky, and Montana
require a party to show that it would be unconscionable to continue the original award based on the change in circumstances. See id. On the other hand,
Massachusetts is one of the few states that allow automatic modification of alimony awards based on an increase in the payor spouse's income. See Wooters
v. Wooters, 677 N.E.2d 704, 705-06 (Mass. App. Ct. 1997).
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ject to reVISIon based on a change in circumstances. 87 Indeed, almost every jurisdiction in the United States permits its courts to
modify alimony awards when a party can demonstrate a change in
circumstance. 88 In Maryland, an award of alimony is subject to modification "upon the motion of either party. "89 The proponent of
modification "must show a change in circumstances either with respect to the [spouse's] ability to pay support or in the [dependant
spouse's] need for support or both."90 What amounts to a substanSee Jensen v. Jensen, 103 Md. App. 678, 689, 645 A.2d 914, 920 (1995) (concluding that a recipient spouse was entitled to reinstatement of an alimony
award based on a change in circumstances). The change in circumstances
standard is well-documented in Maryland jurisprudence. See Stansbury v. Stansbury, 223 Md. 475, 477, 164 A.2d 877, 878 (1960) (noting that a material
change in circumstances justifies a modification of alimony); Warren v. Warren, 218 Md. 212,217, 146 A.2d 34, 37 (1958) (holding that remarriage without further evidence of a substantive change in payor's financial position provided insufficient grounds for modification); Langrell v. Langrell, 145 Md.
340,344, 125 A. 695, 697 (1924) (declaring that without a finding of materially
different circumstances a petition for a reduction in alimony should not have
been granted); Young v. Young, I 61 Md. App. 103, 112, 484 A.2d 1054, 1059
(1984) (citing Brodak, 294 Md. at 10, 447 A.2d at 847) (declaring that the reocipient spouse has the burden of proving a change in circumstance at time
modification is sought); Cole v. Cole,44 Md. App. 935, 939, 409 A.2d 734, 738
(1979) (observing that a material change in circumstances justifies a modification of alimony); Meyer v. Meyer, 41 Md. App. 13, 18, 394 A.2d 1220, 1223
(1978) (noting that "[s]ubstantial changes in needs, financial conditions, and
circumstances" may justify modification or termination of alimony); cf Garner,
257 Md. at 728, 264 A.2d at 860 (holding, in an appeal from a divorce decree,
that a modification in alimony may be warranted when the payor is no longer
paying recipient spouse's expenses at a mental institution); Gebhard v. Gebhard, 253 Md. 125, l31, 252 A.2d 171, 174 (1969) (declaring, in an appeal
from a divorce decree, that an alimony decree is subject to modification as
circumstances change); Moore v. Moore, 218 Md. 218, 221, 145 A.2d 764, 765
(1958) (noting, in the context of temporary alimony modification, a change
in circumstances could supply grounds for modification); Lopez v. Lopez, 206
Md. 509, 520, 112 A.2d 466, 471 (1955) (observing, in an appeal from a divorce decree, that alimony may be modified upward in light of discovery that
payor's income warrants such revision). But see Lott, 17 Md. App. at 444, 302
A.2d at 668-69 (holding that modification upward of alimony payments was
proper even though court found recipient's needs had not substantially
changed).
88. See Bassett, supra note 86, at 29. Forty-six jurisdictions in the United States
have statutory provisions authorizing the modification of alimony under
changed circumstances. See ill. at 29-31.
89. 8A MARYLAND LAw ENCYCLOPEDIA § 178 (1985).
90. Meredith v. Meredith, 614 A.2d 920, 921-22 (D.C. 1992) (quoting A1ibrando v.
A1ibrando, 375 A.2d 9, 15 (D.C. 1977». A court may increase or reduce a sup87.
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tial 91 change is left to the discretion of the court. 92
1. Changed Circumstances Cases in Maryland
In reviewing whether a recipient's alimony award should be increased in relation to the circumstances of the parties, Maryland
courts will consider such factors as the physical condition of the
parties, their ability to work, station in life, and each spouse's wealth
and earning capacity.93 Maryland courts have provided examples of
situations that satisfy the requisite change in circumstances needed
to increase a recipient spouse's alimony award. 94 For example, an increase has been granted when there was a showing of a substantial
increase in the payor spouse's income,95 and also when the recipient

91.

92.

93.

94.

95.

port obligation when there is a showing of a change in circumstances justifying modification. See Gamer, 257 Md. at 728, 264 A2d at 860 (stating that alimony modification may be warranted when the payor spouse is no longer
paying the recipient spouse's expenses at a mental institution); Crandall v.
Crandall, 14 Md. App. 476, 480, 287 A2d 326, 328 (1972) (noting that alimony
awards are never permanent because if the circumstances change, then the
awards are subject to modification); Verges, 13 Md. App. at 613-15, 284 A2d at
453-54 (holding that, based on the change in circumstances, alimony modification was warranted because payor spouse was in failing health and decreased his work hours). In Lott, 17 Md. App. at 440, 302 A.2d at 666, the
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland addressed the question of whether a
substantial change in the payor spouse's income was sufficient to warrant
modification of the alimony award. See id. at 447, 302 A2d at 670. The court
held that the change in the payor spouse's earnings alone was sufficient to increase the recipient spouse's alimony subsidy, regardless of the recipient
spouse's financial situation. See id. at 447-48, 302 A2d at 670-71. The court explained that it is not necessary for both parties to undergo a change in circumstances, because a change in the situation of one of the parties is bound
to affect the other party in one way or another. See id. at 445, 302 A2d at 669.
It should be noted that Maryland courts have alternatively used substantial,
material, or no term at all to modify the change in circumstance standard. See
supra note 86 and accompanying text.
See Lott, 17 Md. App. at 447, 302 A2d at 670.
See Brodak v. Brodak, 294 Md. 10, 28, 447 A2d 847, 856 (1982) (holding that a
court should also consider the length of time the parties lived together, circumstances leading to divorce, and fault); Lott, 17 Md. App. at 450, 320 A2d
at 671-72 (observing that a court should also consider the recipient spouse's
assets and income).
See Blaine v. Blaine, 336 Md. 49, 80, 646 A2d 413, 428 (1994) (holding that the
recipient spouse's failure to obtain a degree was sufficient to modify alimony);
Lott, 17 Md. App. at 447, 302 A.2d at 670 (holding that a substantial increase
in the payor spouse's income was sufficient to justify an increase in alimony).
See Lott, 17 Md. App. at 447, 302 A2d at 670 (holding that an increase in the
payor spouse's income is, in some cases, sufficient to justify an increase in the
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spouse made as much economic progress as possible, but failed to
achieve the court's expectations from when it initially granted the
award. 96 Alternatively, when the payor spouse remarries and consequently incurs greater financial responsibilities, a payor spouse may
assert that the change in circumstances should be considered in
support of a petition to reduce the alimony payments.97 Numerous
reasons exist that do not warrant modifying an alimony award at all.
For example, the unchaste conduct of a spouse98 and a spouse's
abuse of alcohol 99 have been deemed inadequate to justify a change
in the amount of support payments. lOO
Practitioners should be prepared to address complicated factual
situations in which the ideals underlying rehabilitation may be abandoned by a court. Such a situation arose in the Court of Appeals of
Maryland's decision in Blaine v. Blaine. 101 The Blaine case involved a
request for alimony modification under section 11-107 (a) of the
Family Law Article,I02 which permits a court to extend the period of
time for which alimony payments must be made when "'circumstances arise during the period that would lead to a harsh and inequitable result without an extension."'103 Mrs. Blaine had been
awarded rehabilitative alimony l04 based on the assumption that by

96.

97.
98.

99.

100.
lO1.
lO2.
lO3.

104.

amount of alimony paid whether or not the recipient spouse's needs have
changed).
See Blaine, 336 Md. at 74-75, 646 A.2d at 425 (holding that the recipient
spouse's failure to achieve a degree contemplated at the time of divorce and
the subsequent failure to gain employment constituted a change in circumstances sufficient to warrant modification of the divorce decree). For a further
discussion of Blaine, see infra notes lOl-12 and accompanying text.
See Lott, 17 Md. App. at 449, 302 A.2d at 671.
See Meyer v. Meyer, 41 Md. App. 13, 21, 394 A2d 1220, 1224 (1978) (holding
that the recipient spouse's alimony award was not subject to reduction because of her unchaste conduct subsequent to divorce).
See Roberts v. Roberts, 35 Md. App. 497, 506, 371 A2d 689, 694 (1977) (holding that alcoholism is not considered "flagrant misconduct" justifying the reduction of alimony).
See Meyer, 41 Md. App. at 21, 394 A2d at 1224; Roberts, 35 Md. App. at 506, 371
A2d at 694.
336 Md. 49, 646 A2d 413 (1994).
See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
Blaine, 336 Md. at 56, 646 A2d at 416 (quoting MD. CoDE ANN., FAM. LAw §
1I-107(a) (1991». Dr. Blaine's income increased substantially in the years after the divorce, while Mrs. Blaine continued to experience financial difficulties. See itt. at 58, 646 A2d at 417.
For a discussion of rehabilitative alimony, see supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
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obtaining a professional degree, she would eventually increase her
earnings and eliminate her need for support payments. lOS However,
as the fIxed period of time during which she would receive support
approached its end,l06 it became apparent that Mrs. Blaine would
not attain the level of income anticipated at the time of divorce. I07
The domestic relations master recommended extending Mr. Blaine's
obligation to pay alimony for an indefInite period. I08 The trial court
affirmed the master's recommendation and the court of special appeals upheld the ruling. 109 The court of appeals concluded that Mrs.
Blaine's situation, coupled with a failing job market, satisfIed the
requisite change in circumstances and awarded her indefinite
alimony. I 10
Arguably, the incentive to become self-supporting after divorce
is diminished when a court provides indefInite alimony to those
who fail to achieve their fInancial goals. 11I Although the recipient
spouse would retain the burden of proving that efforts had been
made toward becoming self-supporting, a mere showing of a goo<;l
faith attempt may oblige a payor spouse to continue alimony payments indefInitely.1I2 Though the Blaine decision must be limited to
105. See Blaine, 336 Md. at 57-58, 646 A.2d at 417.
106. The initial award of alimony was $800 per month for five years. See ill. at 58,
646 A.2d at 417.
107. See id. at 58-59, 646 A.2d at 417. Mrs. Blaine had hoped that after receiving
her master's degree, she would be able to earn an annual salary of approximately $40,000. See id. at 58,646 A.2d at 417. However, an economic recession
caused the narrow field she was attempting to enter to become static. See id. at
59, 646 A.2d at 417. Furthermore, her degree was not the equivalent of a
Master of Social Work, which further limited her ability to branch out into
teaching or psychological treatment. See ill. These factors caused her to reexamine her financial status and conclude that termination of rehabilitative alimony payments would impair her unstable economic status. See ill. at 58-59,
646 A.2d at 417-18.
108. See ill. at 60, 646 A.2d at 418.
109. See ill.
110. See ill. at 75-76, 646 A.2d at 425-26; see also Tracey v. Tracey, 89 Md. App. 701,
708-12, 599 A.2d 856, 860-61 (1991) (holding that the recipient spouse was
entitled to indefinite alimony when it was shown that her income from two
jobs was equal to only one-third of her former spouse's sole source of income), cert. granted, 325 Md. 551, 601 A.2d 1114 (1992), TlIScinded on other
grounds, 328 Md. 380, 614 A.2d 590 (1992).
Ill. See Hepfer & Ginsburg, supra note 66, at 32.
112. See ill. In their analysis, Hepfer and Ginsburg refer to the dissenting opinion
by Judge Bell, in Blaine, that attacked the majority's reasoning. See id. Judge
Bell asserted that a trial judge could, as a result of the majority's decision,
award indefinite alimony "if the payor former spouse were to hit the lottery,
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its facts, it provides significant commentary as to both the fundamental nature of support obligations and the level of judicial discretion exercised by Maryland courts.
2. Can Retirement of the Payor Result in Changed Circumstances?
There are several cases that deal with the elements necessary
for altering an alimony award for the benefit of the recipient
spouse. ll3 However, little attention has been given to the hardship a
payor spouse must endure throughout that spouse's lifetime. 1I4 Although alimony is no longer considered a lifetime pension for the
payee spouse, lIS there appears to be little support for modifying or
terminating the payor spouse's obligation. 1I6 One scenario that appears to be gaining acceptance by courts outside Maryland arises
when the payor spouse retires. The next section discusses how other
jurisdictions deal with retirement as a factor in alimony modification cases. In Maryland, however, the effect of retirement on a petition to modify alimony has never been addressed. 117
a. Voluntary Retirement as a Factor in Alimony Modification Cases

A number of jurisdictions have addressed the issue of whether
voluntary retirement is a valid reason to reduce alimony payments. lIs Some have concluded that voluntary retirement may con-

113.
114.

115.
116.
117.

118.

settle a lawsuit involving personal injury resulting from an accident occurring
subsequent to the divorce, inherit funds after the divorce, or, as in this case,
increase his or her earnings significantly." Blaine, 336 Md. at 83, 646 A.2d at
430 (Bell, J., dissenting).
See supra notes 93-101 and accompanying text.
See Blaine, 336 Md. at 83, 646 A.2d at 430 (1994) (Bell, J., dissenting) (arguing
that payor spouse is giving a lifetime pension to dependent spouse); Warren v.
Warren, 218 Md. 212, 216, 146 A.2d 34, 3fr37 (1958) (noting that changed financial or other conditions of the payor spouse such as a new wife or birth of
a child was not a sufficient cause for reduction of alimony to the first wife).
See Holston v. Holston, 58 Md. App. 308, 321,473 A.2d 459, 46~6 (1984).
See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
For a discussion of income imputed to a retired payor spouse in the modification of an initial grant of alimony in Maryland, see infra notes 13&-50 and accompanying text.
See Swayze v. Swayze, 408 A.2d 1,8 (Conn. 1978) (noting that early retirement
constituted changed circumstances and warranted modification in alimony
payments); Pimm v. Pimm, 601 So. 2d 534 (Fla. 1992) (noting that voluntary
retirement was a factor to be considered in modifying alimony obligation);
Silvan v. Sylvan, 632 A.2d 528, 530 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993) (" [G]ood
faith retirement at age sixty-five may constitute changed circumstances for
purposes of modification of alimony.").
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stitute a change of circumstances sufficient to reduce alimony payments.Jl9 Other courts have held that an early or voluntary
retirement does not rise to the level of a change in circumstances
and have elected to impute income to the payor spouse. 120
In Pimm v. Pimm, 12 I the Supreme Court of Florida addressed
whether a husband's retirement constituted a change of circumstances that would justify reducing his alimony payments. 122 Answering in the affirmative, the court concluded that the retirement need
only be reasonable. 123 In assessing reasonableness, the court considered "the payor's age, health, and motivation for retirement, as well
as the type of work the payor performs and the age at which others
engaged in that line of work normally retire."124 The court observed
that sixty-five years of age is widely accepted as the normal age of
retirement l25 and that an individual voluntarily retiring before that
age would face a "substantial burden" in demonstrating that the retirement was reasonable. l26 However, even when a payor reaches age

119. See, e.g., In m Marriage of Schrimpf, 687 N.E.2d 171, 175 (Ill. Ct. App. 1997)
(setting forth factors, among them retirement, to be considered in determining whether a reduction in alimony is appropriate); Haslam v. Haslam, 657
P.2d 757, 758 (Utah 1982) (relying upon the payor spouse's retirement as well
as other factors in finding changed circumstances).
120. See, e.g., In m Marriage of Stephenson, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 8, 14-15 (Cal. Ct. App.
1995) (providing that a court may impute income to a payor spouse who
elects early retirement); Leslie v. Leslie, 827 S.W.2d 180, 183 (Mo. 1992) (stating that voluntary loss of employment is not the type of circumstances that allows for a modification of alimony); Stubblebine v. Stubblebine, 473 S.E.2d 72,
74 (Va. Ct. App. 1996) (imputing income when the payor spouse had made an
employment decision to the detriment of the recipient spouse).
121. 601 So. 2d 534 (Fla. 1992).
122. See ilL at 535.
123. See ilL at 537.
124. Id.
125. See ilL The court declared:
The age of sixty-five years has become the traditional and· presumJr
tive age of retirement for American workers: many pension benefits
maximize at the age of sixty-five; taxpayers receive an additional federal tax credit at the age of sixty-five in recognition of the reduced
income which accompanies retirement; under the Social Security Act
the definition of "retirement age" includes "65 years of age"; and the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 defines "normal
retirement age" as including the "time a plan participant attains age
65."
Id. (footnotes omitted).
126. Id.
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sixty-five, retirement does not become presumptively reasonable.127
Instead, a "court should consider the needs of the receiving spouse
and the impact a termination or reduction of alimony would have
on him or her." 128 Other courts have also found that voluntary retirement may amount to a sufficient change of circumstances, but
have emphasized principles of equity in reaching their result.
In Misinonile v. Misinonile,129 the Appellate Court of Connecticut
held that voluntary retirement could offer a sufficient basis for finding a substantial change of circumstances. no Reviewing the trial record, the court emphasized that the payor spouse, who had retired
at sixty-eight, had not done so to avoid or reduce his alimony payments. l3l The Misinonile court emphasized that the payor spouse
could have retired six years earlier and that he had health
problems. 132 The COl,lrt concluded that "[ u] nder the circumstances,
it [was] not unreasonable for the defendant ... to be 'tired' and to
seek the less strenuous and demanding lifestyle offered by
retirement." 133
However, as Smith v. Smith l34 makes clear, a payor spouse needs
to do more than simply invoke the magic word "retirement."135 In
Smith, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine held that the payor
spouse, in using the word "retirement" to describe his voluntary departure from employment and subsequent decrease in income, was
not given a preferred statUS. I36 Nonetheless, the court acknowledged
the weight to be given to such factors as the age and health of the
parties, the circumstances of estrangement, and their station in life,
concluding that the payor spouse, a sixty-four-year-old doctor in failing health, was entitled to a reduction in alimony payments. 137
127. See id.
128. Id.; see also Deegan v. Deegan, 603 A.2d 542, 546 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1992) (holding that a trial court must determine "whether the advantage to
the retiring spouse substantially outweighs the disadvantage to the [recipient]
spouse").
129. 645 A2d 1024 (Conn. Ct. App. 1994).
130. See id. at 1026.
131. See id. at 1027.
132. See id.
133. Id.
134. 419 A2d 1035 (Me. 1980).
135. See ill. at 1038.
136. See ill. (quoting In re Marriage of Smith, 396 N.E.2d 859, 863 (Ill. App. Ct.
1979».
137. See id. at 1039.
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Numerous jurisdictions impute income to a payor spouse when
the payor spouse undertakes an act that results in reduction or loss
of income. 138 In Leslie v. Leslie,139 the former husband sought modification of his alimony based on the fact that his retirement resulted
in a reduced income}40 The husband claimed that his employer
planned to layoff his work shift and that his retirement was therefore involuntary. 141 The Supreme Court of Missouri found the husband's argument on this point unpersuasive}42 Rather, the court
surmised that the husband's actions were voluntary}43
Looking to prior case law, the Leslie court stated the general
rule in Missouri that "a voluntary loss of employment is not a sulr
stantial and continuing change of circumstances such as to allow
modification. "144 The rule operates even when an individual's decision to retire is coaxed by rumors of imminent layoffs. 14S Accordingly, when a payor spouse elects to retire, income can be imputed
to the spouse "according to the spouse's ability to earn by using his
or her best efforts to gain employment suitable to the spouse's
capabilities. "146
Another case emphasizing the payor spouse's earning capacity

138. See, e.g., Grady v. Grady, 747 S.W.2d 77, 78 (Ark. 1988) (finding that a court,
in proper circumstances, may impute income to a spouse according to what
could be earned by the use of best efforts to gain employment suitable to the
payor spouse's ability); Cohen v. Cohen, 76 Cal. Rptr. 2d 866, 870 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1998) (holding that when the ability and opportunity to work are present, earning capacity may properly be imputed for purposes of calculating
child or spousal support even if the party lacks willingness to find more lucrative work).
139. 827 S.W.2d 180 (Mo. 1992).
140. See ilL at 183.
141. See ilL
142. See ilL The trial court record reflected that Mr. Leslie could have transferred
to another shift or plant, and that he in fact continued to work for his employer after retirement so that he could train his replacemenL See ilL
143. See ilL
144. Id. (citing Hughes v. Hughes, 761 S.W.2d 274, 277 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988); Overstreet v. Overstreet, 693 S.W.2d 242, 245 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985); Foster v. Foster,
537 S.W.2d 833, 836 (Mo. CL App. 1976».
145. See ilL
146. Id. (citing Hughes, 761 S.W.2d at 276; Klinge v. Klinge, 554 S.W.2d 474, 476
(Mo. Ct.· App. 1977». The Hughes court emphasized that it is the payor
spouse's "past, present, and anticipated earning capacity [that] serve[s] as competent evidence of [the spouse's] ability to pay the amounts awarded." Hughes,
761 S.W.2d at 276.

216

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 28

is In re Marriage of Stephenson,147 in which the Court of Appeals of
California articulated an "earning capacity" rule in the language
that follows:
[W] here the supporting spouse elects to retire early and to
not seek reasonably remunerative employment available
under the circumstances, then the court can properly impute income to that supporting spouse given that spouse's
obligation to p~ovide support and the general notion a supporting spouse must make reasonable efforts to obtain employment which would generate a reasonable income under
the circumstances to meet a continuing support
obligation. 148
Noteworthy is the court's admonition that a payor spouse, who
is of retirement age, need not feel compelled to work just to maintain his alimony obligation. 149 Rather, a court must take into consideration "the totality of the surrounding circumstances unique to
each individual case, including earning capacity. "ISO
Though not addressed in the alimony modification context, recently at issue in a Maryland case was the effect of retirement of the
payor spouse in an initial grant of alimony. In Crabill v. Crabill, lSI
the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland addressed the issue of
whether income should be imputed to a payor spouse who retired
at the age of fifty-three based on past earnings as a part-time
painter. IS2 After hearing expert testimony regarding a painter's potential earning capacity, the domestic relations master imputed the
supplemental income to the payor spouse. IS3 Although affirming the
master's recommendation, the trial judge reduced the amount. IS4
In an unsuccessful attempt to argue that it was "improper for a
court to impute income to a voluntarily retired person,"ISS Crabill
failed to cite Maryland authority, relying instead on Commonwealth v.
147. 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 8 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).
148. [d. at 14.
149. See id. at 15 n.4.
150. [d.

151. 119 Md. App. 249, 704 A.2d 532 (1998).
152. See id. at 252, 704 A.2d at 533. The court reviewed the original action for abso-

lute divorce, alimony, and child support. See id. The payor had retired from
his employment with the District of Columbia Fire Department. See iii. at 255,
704 A.2d at 535.
153. See id. at 257; 704 A.2d at 536.
154. See id. at 262, 704 A.2d at 538.
155. [d.
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The court of special appeals distinguished the two cases on
several grounds. 157 The payor spouse in Ross was sixty-five years of
age and in poor health,158 whereas Crabill was considerably younger
and in good health. 159 The parties in Ross had lived together after
the payor spouse had retired,l60 while the Crabills had not. 161 The
Ross court observed that "when retirement reduces the income of
the couple, the wife who subsequently leaves the marital domicile
cannot be expected to be restored to the standard of living she enjoyed while her husband was working."I62 Although seemingly inapposite in most respects, the Crabill court nonetheless found that Ross
actually supported the imputing of income under Mr. Crabill's circumstances and affirmed the lower court's ruling. 163
While Crahilfs application to alimony modification may be
strained, it does provide two guideposts for the practitioner. First,
the Crabill court emphasized that the husband in Ross was sixty-five
years old. l64 Second, the court clearly took into consideration the
health of the payor spouse. 165 Thus, it appears as though Maryland
courts are likely to give weight to a payor spouse's overall physical
capacity in ruling on a modification petition. Courts in jurisdictions
outside Maryland have also stressed the importance of the payor
spouse's physical capacity.l66
RosS.156

h. Diminished Physical Capacity of Payor Spouse

When a serious health problem impedes the payor spouse's
ability to pay alimony, a court may modify the payment amount. 167
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

164.

165.
166.
167.

213 A2d 135 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1965).
See Crabill, 119 Md. App. at 262-63, 704 A2d at 538-39.
See id. at 262, 704 A2d at 538 (citation omitted).
See id. at 263, 704 A2d at 539.
See id. at 262, 704 A2d at 538 (citation omitted).
See id. at 263, 704 A2d at 539.
Id. at 262, 704 A2d at 538-39 (citing Commonwealth v. Ross, 213 A2d 135,
138 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1965».
See id. at 263, 704 A2d at 539. The court observed that, "[the trial court] is
not restricted by the actual income of the husband, but may take into consideration his assets, earning capacity and other attendant circumstances." Id.
(quoting Ross, 213 A2d at 137).
See id. at 262, 704 A2d at 538; see also Pimm v. Pimm, 601 So. 2d 534, 537 (Fla.
1992) (noting that "[t]he age of sixty-five years has become the traditional
and presumptive age of retirement for American workers").
See Crabill, 119 Md. App. at 262, 704 A2d at 538.
See infra notes 167-77 and accompanying text.
See Hampton v. Hampton, 720 So. 2d 949, 952 (Ala. Civ. App. 1998) (holding
that a stroke causing brain damage suffered by a payor spouse constituted a
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In Hampton v. Hampton,168 the Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama
held that the payor spouse's stroke, causing brain damage, constituted a material change in circumstances that warranted the trial
court to reduce the amount of his alimony payments. l69 The Hampton court considered "such factors as the recipient spouse's financial
needs, the amount of the estate of each spouse, the ability of the
payor spouse to respond to the recipient spouse's needs, the ability
of each spouse to earn income, and the remarriage of either party"
in determining whether it was appropriate to reduce the former
husband's alimony payments. 170 The court also noted that the burden of proving that a sufficient change in circumstances had occurred was on the party attempting to modify the alimony award.17J
While it has been established that physical deterioration, failing
health, and age may constitute grounds for modifying alimony payments, these circumstances do not guarantee modification. 172 For
example, in Sifers v. Sifers,173 the Missouri Court of Appeals held that

168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

173.

material change in circumstances warranting modification of alimony); Swayze
v. Swayze, 408 A.2d 1, 8 (Conn. 1978) (holding that the trial court properly
modified alimony payments by the payor spouse due to changed circumstances as a result of severe and debilitating medical problems); Bronson v.
Bronson, 471 A.2d 977, 979 (Conn. App. Ct. 1984) (finding a substantial
change in circumstances warranted alimony modification when a payor
spouse's physical disability arose after the original alimony decree); In 111 Marriage of Charles J. Columbo, 555 N.E.2d 56, 57 (Ill. Ct. App. 1990) (stating
that a payor spouse's retirement, three months prior to his sixty-fifth birthday
due to a heart condition, was a substantial change in circum-stances warranting modification of alimony); see also 24 AM. JUR. 2D Divorce and Separation §§
827-28 (1998) (discussing changes in the financial circumstances of a payor
spouse which warranted modification of alimony payments).
720 So. 2d 949 (Ala. Civ. App. 1998).
See itl. at 952.
Id. (citing Swain v. Swain, 660 So. 2d 1356 (Ala. Civ. App. 1995».
See itl.
See Silver v. Silver, 113 So. 2d 921, 923-24 (Ala. 1959) (holding that a payor
spouse's physical condition did not warrant modification of alimony); Galligher v. GaJligher, 527 So. 2d 858, 860-61 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (holding
that the payor's physical condition that inhibited his ability to work overtime
did not warrant reduction in alimony payments); Sifers v. Sifers, 544 S.W.2d
269 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976) (holding that modification was unwarranted when
husband failed to demonstrate that he was in poor health or unable to obtain
employment after losing his job); Saul v. Saul, 107 A.2d 182, 183-84 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1954) (holding that the payor spouse's heart attack and hospital
stay did not constitute a change in circumstances warranting modification because his earning capacity had not been substantially reduced).
544 S.W.2d 269 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976).
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a sixty-two-year-old man who was unable to continue working in his
. usual capacityl74 had not sustained the burden of establishing a
change in circumstances sufficient to justify reducing his support
obligations. 17s The court based its conclusion on the payor spouse's
lack of evidence demonstrating a physical inability to work in other
fields of employment. 176 Under the court's reasoning, the payor
spouse had to prove ail inability to work in any other capacity and
provide evidence that his voluntary election to retire was not an attempt to escape his support obligations. 177 Thus, Sifers illustrates a
subjective element courts often consider in deciding whether to
modify an alimony award-the payor's motivation for retiring.
c. Good Faith Retirement

Some jurisdictions focus on whether a payor spouse's voluntary
decision to retire is made in good faith. In these jurisdictions, good
faith is an important consideration when deciding whether to permit or deny an alimony reduction based on a payor spouse's retirement. 178 Generally, a self-imposed decrease in or cessation of income of a payor spouse for the purpose of avoiding an alimony
obligation does not constitute a material change in circumstances
that would justify reducing alimony payments. 179 However, when a
174. See ilL at 269-70. The payor spouse had undergone treatment for a malignant

kidney, because of which he had lost his job. See id.
175. See ilL
176. See id. at 270. The payor spouse had worked in various positions in the choc<T

late industry. See id. He had applied for employment only within that field. See
id.
177. See ill.; see also Saul, 107 A.2d at 183-84 (finding that the payor spouse's
changed circumstances were insufficient to warrant modification when it appeared that he deliberately changed his circumstances to avoid support obligations).
178. See Tydings v. Tydings, 349 A2d 462, 464 (D.C. Ct. App. 1975) (holding that a
payor spouse's decision to voluntarily retire, absent a substantial showing of
good faith, did not constitute a change of circumstances warranting a modification of alimony); see also McFadden v. McFadden, 563 A2d 180, 183 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1989) (McEwen,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (contending that voluntary retirement constitutes a change in circumstances for
purposes of modifying alimony decrees without determining whether retirement was made in good faith); cf. Silvan v. Sylvan, 632 A.2d 528, 530 (NJ.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993) (concluding that good faith retirement at age sixtyfive may constitute a change in circumstances warranting a modification in alimony payments).
179. See Tydings, 349 A2d at 463; Blowitz v. Blowitz, 221 N.E.2d 160, 164 (Ill. Ct.
App. 1966); Crosby v. Crosby, 29 S.E.2d 241, 243 (Va. 1944); Lambert v. Lamben, 403 P.2d 664, 667-68 (Wash. 1965). For a discussion of voluntary retire-
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payor spouse has retired in good faith, and not for the purpose of
avoiding an alimony obligation, retirement may satisfy the material
change in circumstances requirement and result in alimony
reductions. ISO
In Silvan v. Sylvan, 18 I the payor spouse retired at the age of
sixty-three and one-half years and sought reduction of alimony.182
The trial court denied a motion for modification. 183 Reversing the
trial court, the Superior Court of New Jersey concluded the "motivation which led to the decision to retire" was one of several considerations that suggested the need for reduction in alimony
payments. 184
Similarly, in McFadden v. McFadden,185 the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania held that changed financial circumstances caused by a
payor spouse's voluntary retirement should be considered when assessing a petition for alimony modification. 186 Noting that the
master specifically found that the retirement was in "good faith,"I87
the court reasoned that if the parties had not divorced, and if the
payor spouse had planned to retire at a certain age, the recipient
spouse could not have complained that the household income
would have been reduced by the payor spouse's retirement. 188
Therefore, if a retirement after divorce is made in good faith, and
not in an effort to avoid legal obligations, an alimony recipient
should have no greater claim than if no divorce had taken place. 189
The dissent in McFadden asserted that the payor spouse's voluntary retirement did not constitute a material change in circum-

180.

181.
182.
183.

184.

185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

ment as grounds for modification of alimony, see supra notes 118-50 and accompanying text.
See Misinonile v. Misinonile, 645 A.2d 1024, 1027 (Conn. App. Ct. 1994);
Silvan, 632 A.2d at 530.
632 A.2d 528 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993).
See ill. at 529.
See id. By the time the appellate court affirmed the trial court's denial of the
husband's motion for modification, the husband had turned sixty-five. See ill.
He then renewed his motion, which was again denied, leading to this opinion.
See ill.
See ill. at 530. A court should consider whether the retirement was reasonable
under all of the circumstances, or whether it was primarily motivated by the
payor spouse's desire to reduce his alimony payments. See ill.'
563 A.2d 180 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989).
See ill. at 183.
See ill. at 183 n.3.
See ill.
See ill.
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stances warranting modification. l90 The dissent pointed out that if
the parties had intended the husband's planned retirement at sixtyfive to constitute a material change in circumstances, that intent
should have been expressed in the alimony agreement since the
planned retirement was only five years away at the time of the divorce. 191 Nevertheless, the majority declared that alimony awards
"need not reflect all contingencies,"192 likening the payor's retirement to death or disability.193 Moreover, it is important to note that
the majority did not hold that the husband was automatically entitled to a reduction in his alimony payment; rather, the court held
that the lower court should have held an evidentiary hearing on
whether a modification was warranted after considering the
changed financial circumstances caused by the payor spouse's voluntary retirement. 194
Minnesota shares the view that" [i]f the [retirement] was made
in good faith, [the recipient spouse and child] should share in the
hardship as they would have had the parties remained together."195
The Court of Appeals of Minnesota remanded In re Marriage of Richards196 to the lower court to determine the payor spouse's motivation for retirement. 197 The court explained that if the lower court
found that the husband retired in good faith, Minnesota case law
authorizing alimony reductions after voluntary retirement would
control. 198 However, if the lower court found that the payor spouse
acted in bad faith to limit his income, case law precluded reducing
alimony payments. l99 The Richards court further directed the trial
court to consider the payor spouse's "health and employment his190. See ill. at 184.
191. See ill. (McEwan,j., concurring in part and dissenting in part). For additional
information on the role of agreements in the modification of alimony awards,
see supra note 5 and accompanying text.
192. Id. at 183 (citing Teribery v. Teribery, 516 A.2d 33, 37-38 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1986».
193. See #d.
194. See McFadden, 563 A.2d at 183. Compare 23 PA CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3701 (West
1999) (setting forth seventeen factors for consideration in an alimony award),
with MD. CODE ANN .. FAM. LAw § 11-I06(b) (1998) (outlining twelve factors
courts are required to consider when making alimony awards).
195. Geisner v. Geisner, 319 N.W.2d 718, 720 (Minn. 1982); see also In re Marriage
of Richards, 472 N.W.2d 162, 164-65 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).
196. 472 N.W.2d 162 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).
197. See ill. at 165.
198. See ill.
199. See ill.
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tory, the availability of and expectations regarding early retirement
at the time of divorce, and the prevailing managerial policies and
economic conditions present at the time of retirement, together
with whatever subjective reasons the obligor may offer."200
While it may seem that good faith often supports a reduction
in alimony or, at least, that courts encourage fact-finding on the issue of a payor spouse's motivation for voluntary retirement, practitioners should be prepared to address the following argument: a
payor spouse simply does "not have the right to divest himself of his
earning ability at the expense of [his former spouse and
children] . "201
In re Marriage of IZo,ilO2 involved a payor spouse who entered
medical school after his divorce rather than continuing his employment. 203 Petitioning the court to modify his alimony obligation to
the income of a full-time student,204 the payor spouse argued that
his earning capacity should not be considered, instead the focus
should be on his actual earnings.2os The reasoning was that earning
capacity should only be considered when the court finds that the
payor has acted deliberately to reduce his income in order to avoid
his support obligations. 206 However, the court held that while the
payor spouse was free to pursue a medical degree, he was not free
to abandon his responsibilities to his former spouse and children. 2OO
The court asserted "that a finding of good faith [does not] pre200. Id. These factors were applied in Minnesota in a subsequent case. See Walker
v. Walker, 553 N.W.2d 90, 95 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996) (finding that a fifty-nineyear~ld husband did not act in bad faith when he did not seek employment
after being fired from his job).
201. In n1 Marriage of Ilas, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 345, 350 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (holding
that earning capacity of a former husband could be considered even in absence of deliberate attempt to refuse to maintain or seek employment).
202. 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 345 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
203. See id. at 346-47.
204. See id.
205. See id. at 347.
206. See ill. at 347-48 (quoting Philbin v. Philbin, 96 Cal. Rptr. 408 (Cal. App. 3d
1971) ("'The rule [that alimony may be based on earning capacity rather than
actual earnings] seems to be applied only when it appears from the record
that there is a deliberate attempt on the part of the husband to avoid his financial responsibilities. "'»; see also In n1 Marriage .of Meegan, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d
799 (1992) (holding that a payor spouse who quit a high-paying job to enter a
monastery acted in good faith and had his alimony obligation reduced to
zero).
207. See In n1 Marriage of Ilas, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 350.
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vent[] use of the earning capacity standard. "208 Thus, the payor's
motivation 209 in quitting his job and entering medical school was
not dispositive. 2lo Instead, the court imputed the payor spouse's
earning capacity to him as actual income. 211
The concept of good faith has enjoyed significant consideration
in the arena of alimony modification after retirement. Lawyers in
the area should discern the motivation of the retiree and recognize
factual circumstances in which those motivations may affect a
court's treatment of voluntary retirement as constituting a change
in circumstances warranting a modification of alimony.212 Although
Maryland's statutory provisions provide little guidance in assessing
what should constitute a sufficient change in circumstances, the
multi-factor framework established for assessing an initial award
lends support for adopting a more elaborate balancing approach as
illustrated in the Section that follows.
d. Balancing Approach: Weighing the Advantage to the Payor Spouse
Against the Detriment to the Recipient Spouse
As any change in an alimony award will simultaneously affect
the payor and recipient, it is necessary to determine the impact that
modification of support payments will have on both parties. For example, in Dilger v. Dilger,213 the Superior Court of New Jersey addressed the issue of early retirement and the termination of alimony payments based on a change in circumstances. 214 The payor
spouse elected early retirement and subsequently stopped making
alimony payments to the recipient without providing any notice.21S
208. ld. For a discussion of the judicial practice of imputing of income after considering earning capacity, see supra notes 138-50 and accompanying text.
209. The payor argued that "a lifelong dream of attending medical school" motivated his action. lias, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 348.
210. See ill.
211. See ill. at 350.
212. For a discussion of the theory of voluntary impoverishment as it relates to alimony modification, see supra notes 238-57 and accompanying text.
213. 576 A2d 951 (NJ. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1990).
214. See ill. at 952. Earning approximately $85,000-$90,000 annually at the time of
this case, the payor spouse elected to retire early from a job with the New
York Stock Exchange. See id. at 952-53. In preparation for retirement, the
payor purchased an eighty-six-acre farm in Pennsylvania. See id. at 953.
215. See ill. Mrs. Dilger, who earned approximately $18,000 annually from her employment position with Citibank, was forced to use funds from a personal injury action to payoff the balance of her mortgage, and was additionally burdened by her son who suffered from black lung disease and was not entirely
self-sufficient. See ill.
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As a result, the recipient spouse faced a foreclosure due to an inability to comply with monthly mortgage payments. 216
In analyzing the payor spouse's cross-motion to terminate alimony payments, the court declared: "that a better approach in assessing whether early retirement constitutes a change of circumstances is to inquire not only as to whether the retirement was in
good faith but also whether, in light of all the surrounding circumstances, it was reasonable for the supporting former spouse to elect
early retirement."217 The factors relevant to this inquiry were '"the
age, health of the party, his motives in retiring, the timing of the
retirement, his ability to pay maintenance even after retirement and
the ability of the other spouse to provide for himself or herself."'218
Based on these factors, the court concluded that the payor spouse's
voluntary retirement "was neither in good faith nor, under the circumstances, otherwise reasonable. "219 As a result, his retirement
constituted "self-induced 'changed circumstances'" and any modification of his support obligation was improper. 220

After the decision in Dilger, the Superior Court of New Jersey
clarified and supplemented the Dilger analyses in Deegan v. Deegan. 221
In Deegan, the payor spouse voluntarily retired at age sixty-one, after
forty-two years of employment as a steamfitter, and moved for an order terminating alimony.222 The trial court denied his application to
terminate alimony.223
On appeal, the superior court noted that when a change in circumstances is involuntary, all a court must consider is the financial
216. See itl.
217. It!.. at 955.
218. It!.. (quoting In re Marriage of Smith, 396 N.E.2d 859, 863 (1\1. App. 3d 1979».
Other significant factors were "the reasonable expectations of the parties at
the time of the agreement, evidence bearing on whether the supporting
spouse was planning retirement at a particular age, and the opportunity given
to the dependent spouse to prepare to live on the reduced support." It!..
219. Id.
220. Id. at 956.
221. See Deegan v. Deegan, 603 A.2d 542, 546 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992) (explaining that deciding whether a spouse may voluntarily retire "will depend
on the individual circumstances of a particular case").
222. See it!.. at 543.
223. See it!.. The trial court observed:
He's been in the labor market for forty-two years. He is a healthy individual. There's no allegations that he is in bad health. So he does
have the ability. He'll just have to go out and find a job to generate
the income. So his application to terminate alimony will be denied.
It!..
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situations of the parties. 224 However, a voluntary change in circumstances required a two-step analysis. 22S First, the court must determine whether the payor spouse has retired in good faith and the retirement was reasonable. 226 If the court answers in the negative, the
analysis ends. 227 However, if the answer is in the affirmative, the
court must decide "whether the advantage to the retiring spouse
substantially outweighs the disadvantage to the payee spouse. "228 If
this advantage to the retiring spouse does substantially outweigh the
disadvantage to the payee, the retirement will be deemed a legitimate change in circumstances warranting a modification. 229 The
court reversed and remanded the case for a review of the facts in
light of the standards the court set forth.230
Florida has established an approach similar to the approach
crafted by the Deegan court. In Pimm v. Pimm, 231 the Supreme Court
of Florida acknowledged that although sixty-five may be viewed as
the median retirement age, not every payor spouse should be permitted to conclude a legal support obligation through retirement.232
224. See id.; see also Epstein v. Epstein, 656 A.2d 707, 710 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1994)
(holding that a payor spouse's involuntary dismissal from his job was a substantial change in circumstances that supported the termination of alimony
payments).
225. See Deegan, 603 A.2d at 546.
226. See id. at 544-45.
227. See Dilger v. Dilger, 576 A.2d 951, 956 (NJ. Sup. Ct. 1990).
228. Deegan, 603 A.2d at 546. The court continued its analysis by observing that
when a party's basis for retiring is premised upon health concerns and the
detriment to the recipient spouse is simultaneously minimal, the balance will
swing to the favor of the payor spouse. See id. Conversely, when a desire to
create a new lifestyle free of past obligations fuels the payor spouse's retirement and such a change in circumstances leaves the recipient spouse in a detrimental financial position, the balancing test will undoubtedly find in favor of
the recipient spouse. See id.
229. See itt. The court further commented:
Thus, where a payor spouse has substantial reasons for retiring (i.e.,
health concerns) and the effect on the [recipient] spouse is minimal
(due for example, to other available income, qualifying for social ge..
curity, or new employment) the balance will be struck in favor of the
payor. Where, on the other hand, the payor spouse simply wants a
new life and the [recipient] spouse will become destitute without
support, the [recipient's] interests will prevail.
[d.
230. See id. at 546-47.
231. 601 So. 2d 534 (Fla. 1992).
232. See id. at 537 ("Based upon this widespread acceptance of sixty-five as the normal retirement age, we find that one would have a significant burden to show
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The court must consider "the needs of the receiving spouse and the
impact the termination or reduction of alimony would have on him
or her" in reaching a decision as to terminate or reduce a support
obligation.233
With this framework established, the Deegan test has served as
an analytical foundation for one other jurisdiction faced with this
unsettled issue. In Barbarine v. Barbarine,234 the Court of Appeals of
Kentucky adopted this test. Following the analysis set forth in Deegan, the court found that the seventy-year-old recipient spouse with
a meager monthly income from social security benefits would be
unable to support herself if alimony support payments were reduced. 23s There was no evidence presented tending to show that the
husband was forced to retire or that he was in poor health. 236
Adopting the balancing test of Deegan, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky found that the detriment to the payee spouse outweighed the
benefits to the payor and consequently denied the husband's requested modification of alimony.237
e. Voluntary Impoverishment
Another factor which may be considered by a court in assessing
whether to grant a modification of alimony is voluntary impoverishment. 238 Voluntary impoverishment occurs when a payor spouse has
voluntarily abandoned well-paying employment for a lower paying
position or has otherwise taken steps to purposely deplete his financial resources. 239 Courts in jurisdictions throughout the nation have
that a voluntary retirement before the age of sixty-five is reasonable.")
233. Id.
234. 925 S.W.2d 831 (Ky. Ct. App. 1996).
235. See id. The court concluded that the payor spouse knew of his former spouse's
financial situation at the time of his decision and her social security benefits
provided her sole income. See id. In addition, the court examined his decision
not to receive social security payments until reaching the age of sixty-five to
obtain a higher payment. See id. The court specifically cited the Deegan factors
and balancing test. See id. at 833.
236. See id.
237. See id.
238. See Smith v. Smith, 419 A.2d 1035, 1038 (Me. 1980) (holding that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in reducing the payor spouse's alimony payments by only $50, even though his income dropped from $29,000 to $7,000
after retirement).
239. See id. at 1038. An additional definition is provided in American Jurisprudence, which explains voluntary impoverishment as follows:
Where the obligor spouse has voluntarily relinquished a well-paying
practice and has taken a position at modest salary the court may base
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held voluntary reduction of income does not constitute valid
grounds to modify an alimony award. 240
In Tydings v. Tydings,241 the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that a payor spouse was not entitled to a modification of
alimony payments due to the fact that his decrease in income was
self-induced. 242 In Tydings, a fifty-five-year-old payor spouse opted for
early retirement, even though he suffered no physical or psychological impairments. 243 Based on this change in circumstances, the
payor spouse petitioned the court to reduce the amount of alimony
he was paying his ex-wife. 244 The trial court denied his petition on
the grounds that the change was insufficient to warrant modification. 24S The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision stating
"voluntary reduction in income or self-imposed curtailment of earning capacity, absent a substantial showing of good faith, will not

240.

241.
242.
243.
244.
245.

the amount of alimony on capacity to earn money, or on prospective
earnings. Though an award of alimony may be based on ability to
earn as distinguished from actual income, the rule is applied only
when it appears from the record that there is a deliberate attempt on
the part of the obligor spouse to avoid family responsibilities by refusing to seek or accept gainful employment, willfully refusing to secure or take a job, deliberately not making application to business,
intentionally depressing income to an artificial low, or intentionally
leaving employment to go into another business.
24 AM. JUR. 20 Divorce and Separation § 662 (2d ed. 1983).
See Gerlach v. Gerlach, 267 N.W.2d 149, 150 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978) (concluding that a payor spouse's unemployment was self-imposed and rejecting the
payor's claim of changed circumstances sufficient to warrant reduction of alimony); Bradley v. Bradley, 880 S.W.2d 376, 379 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994) (holding
that a reduction in income, resulting from the payor spouse's voluntary retirement was not reason enough to warrant reduction in his alimony payments);
Pope v. Pope, 559 N.W.2d 192, 196 (Neb. 1997) (finding that a payor spouse's
termination from employment for falling asleep at his desk did not constitute
adequate cause to justify modification of his alimony obligation); Fleischmann
v. Fleischmann, 601 N.Y.S.2d 16, 16 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (rejecting payor
spouse's request for modification of alimony due to the fact that his reduced
earnings were attributable to his voluntary decision to accept less lucrative employment); Herndon v. Herndon, 305 N.W.2d 917, 918 (S.D. 1981) (citing Simmons v. Simmons, 290 N.W.2d 319 (S.D. 1940» (finding that a "person cannot
voluntarily reduce his income in order to avoid alimony and support payments").
349 A.2d 462 (D.C. 1975).
See id. at 464. In Tydings, the payor spouse's decrease in income was based on
his election to voluntarily retire. See id.
See id. at 463.
See id.
See id.
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constitute such a change of circumstances as to warrant a
modification. "246
The issue of volun tary im poverishmen t was addressed by the
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland in the context of an initial alimonyaward in Colburn v. Colburn.247 In Colburn, a husband appealed
a trial court's award of alimony to his wife on the grounds that his
potential income was considered in computing the alimony amount,
rather that the amount of income he was actuaUy receiving at the
time of the divorce. 248 The court found that the husband's retirement at the age of fifty-one, his surrendering of a lucrative salary,
and his act of transferring all of his stock to his nephew pending
the divorce constituted voluntary impoverishment and made his current income invalid for determining an alimony amount. 249
In 1992, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, in John O. v.
Jane 0.,250 enunciated a clear set of factors to be considered in determining whether parties to a divorce proceeding had voluntarily
impoverished themselves.251 Although John O. addressed voluntary
impoverishment in the child support context, the court of special
appeals subsequently adopted the same factors in the alimony setting in Guarino v. Guarino.252
In Guarino, the court of special appeals addressed whether a recipient spouse had voluntarily impoverished herself and the effect
such a finding would have on her eligibility for temporary ali246. [d. at 464.
247. 15 Md. App. 503, 292 A.2d 121 (1972) (noting that when a spouse voluntarily
impoverished himself, income and capital holdings prior to such acts could be
considered in determining an alimony award).
248. See id. at 504, 292 A.2d at 123.
249. See id. at 515-16, 292 A2d at 128-29.
250. 90 Md. App. 406, 601 A.2d 149 (1992) (remanding for a determination of
whether the payor spouse had voluntarily impoverished hi~elf based on enumerated factors).
251. See id. at 421, 601 A2d at 156 (setting out factors to be considered in determining whether a party is voluntarily impoverished, including the following:
current physical condition, level of education, timing of any change in employment or other financial circumstances relative to the divorce proceedings,
the relationship between the parties before the divorce proceedings, the efforts made to find and retain work, whether the party has ever withheld support, past work history, the area in which the parties live and the status of the
job market there, and any other considerations presented by the parties).
252. 112 Md. App. I, 6, 684 A2d 23, 25-26 (1996) (holding that the same factors
used in analyzing child support voluntary impoverishment cases should be applicable in determining pendente lite alimony awards).
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mony.2S3 In appealing the award for temporary alimony, the payor
spouse argued that his wife was voluntarily impoverishing herself because she was capable of contributing to her own support. 2S4 The
Guarino court concluded, however, based on the evidence and after
considering the ten factors set out in John 0., that the wife had not
voluntarily impoverished herself and was indeed eligible for alimony
pendente lite.2S5 In so concluding, the court cited its prior use of the
John O. factors in Colburn within the alimony context.256
The Court of Appeals of Maryland has yet to address the issue
of voluntary impoverishment in the specific context of alimony
modification. However, it can be inferred from the Colburn and
Guarino decisions, both in the initial granting of temporary and statutory alimony, that the Maryland courts may apply the concept of
voluntary impoverishment to deny a former spouse's petition for
modification of alimony payments. 2S7
IV. TERMINATION OF ALIMONY
In Maryland, petitions to terminate alimony are governed by
statute.2S8 Specifically, section 11-108 of the Family Law Article lists
three occurrences that permit a court to terminate alimony. Alimony may terminate upon the death of either party,2S9 remarriage
of the payee spouse,260 and when harsh and inequitable results
See ill. at 3, 684 A.2d at 24.
See ill. at 1, 684 A.2d at 23.
See ill. at 15, 684 A.2d at 30.
See ill. at 15 n.4, 684 A.2d at 30 n.4.
See generaUy Colburn v. Colburn, 15 Md. App. 503, 514-15, 292 A.2d 121, 128
(1972) (quoting 24 AM. JUR. 20 Divorce and Separation § 622 (2d ed. 1983»
(finding, prior to the enactment of § 12-201 (b)(2) , that "where the husband
has voluntarily relinquished a well-paying practice and has taken a position at
a modest salary the court may base the amount of alimony upon his capacity
to earn money, or upon his prospective earnings"); Quinn v. Quinn, 11 Md.
App. 638, 643, 276 A.2d 425, 427 (1971) (holding that it is the party's overall
financial ability to support and not merely the party's current income which
controls the amount of alimony awarded).
258. See MD. CODE ANN .. FAM. LAw § 11-108 (1998) (providing that, unless the parties agree otherwise, alimony terminates on the death of a party, the remarriage of the recipient, or if a court determines that termination is necessary to
avoid a harsh and inequitable result).
259. See ill. § 11-108(1).
260. See ill. § 11-108(2). Also, alimony has been held to terminate when reconciliation between the spouses results in their sharing a residence. See McCaddin v.
McCaddin, 116 Md. 567, 574, 82 A.2d 554, 557 (1911) ("[I]f the wife returns
to her husband after a divorce a mensa et thcmJ, and is reconciled with him, she
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
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would otherwise occur if the payor spouse was forced to continue
making payments. 261
The rationale that underlies terminating alimony payments
when either party dies is clear.262 The death of a party would render
payment or receipt of alimony impossible. The reasoning for terminating alimony when the recipient spouse remarries is also wellsupported. 263 In years past, the wife had a generally accepted right
to be supported by her husband. 264 It was presumed that the wife
was unable to support herself.265 Alimony was ordered to be paid as
a means of support during a given time period. 266 When the wife,
and now the wife or husband remarries, alimony payments will terminate because the spouse has gained support from another
source. 267
However, the purpose underlying the termination of alimony
payments in order to avoid "harsh and inequitable" results remains
undeveloped in Maryland case law. On its face, the term "harsh and
inequitable" is ambiguous. Compounding that problem is the fact
that the Maryland courts have not addressed the issue of what constitutes "harsh and inequitable." One plausible explanation that
supports why the legislature drafted the statute using such broad
language is that it intended for the judiciary to make use of the discretion that is typically allowed in domestic relations cases generally,
and matters concerning alimony specifically.268
The purpose of section 11-107,269 which addresses extending the
period of alimony and modifying the amount, is "to provide for an
appropriate degree of spousal support in the form of alimony after
the dissolution of the marriage. "270 It follows that in some situations,
namely those mentioned in section 11-108,271 the "appropriate decannot continue to have alimony.").
See MD. CODE ANN .. FAM. LAw § 11-108(3).
See itl. § 11-108 (l) .
See itl. § 11-108(2).
See CLARK, supra note 41, § 14.1, at 420.
See itl.
See McAlear v. McAlear, 298 Md. 320, 331, 469 A2d 1256, 1261 (1984).
See itl.
See Blaine v. Blaine, 336 Md. 49, 66, 646 A2d 413, 421 (1993).
See MD. CODE ANN .. FAM. LAw § 11-107 (1998) (extension of period; modification of amount).
270. Blaine, 336 Md. at 64, 646 A2d at 421 (quoting McAlear, 298 Md. at 348, 469
A2d at 1256).
271. That is, the death of either party, remarriage of the recipient, or to avoid a
harsh and inequitable result. See MD. CoDE ANN .. FAM. LAw § 11-108.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
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gree" may be zero.272 Indeed, if the promotion of equity and fairness constitutes at least some part of the foundation of Maryland
family law, it may appear troubling that Maryland appellate courts
have never had an occasion to interpret the "harsh and inequitable
result" language of section 11-108(3) in a published opinion. One
reason could be that alimony typically does not need to be terminated because it tends to terminate itself. Alimony may be viewed as
a continuance of the support to which the wife was entitled under
the marriage, damages for a breach of the marriage contract, or
punishment for adultery.273 However, in Maryland, as with many
other jurisdictions, alimony is viewed most often as "rehabilitative. "274 Alimony in Maryland exists primarily to allow for a reasonable period of time during which the recipient spouse is expected to
obtain education or training to become self-supporting. 27S Thus, alimony often terminates at a definite point that was established in the
initial alimony proceedings. Other jurisdictions have indicated more
heightened reluctance to terminate alimony payments than in the
modification context.
For example, in McNutt v. McNutt,276 the Court of Civil Appeals
of Alabama held that the retirement of the payor spouse,277 due to
degenerative arthritis, did not preclude him from finding other
forms of employment. 278 At trial, the recipient spouse presented evidence that the payor spouse did not always perform manual labor
in his shop, but rather normally completed paperwork and administrative duties. 279 In response, the payor spouse presented evidence illustrating that he was no longer capable of performing physical
work, that his condition would worsen over time, and that he had
272.
273.
274.
275.

See II Cal. App. 4th 156 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
See ClARK, supra note 41, § 16.1, at 620-21.
See supra notes 53-60 and accompanying text.
See Blaine, 336 Md. at 62, 646 A2d at 419 (explaining the history of Maryland's

276.
277.

view of alimony). The Governor's Commission on Domestic Relations Laws,
which submitted the bill that in 1980 became Maryland's alimony statute, proposed this significant change to Maryland's approach to alimony. See ill. The
bill provided generally for alimony to be awarded for fixed periods, with allowances for extensions in certain situations. See ill.
593 So. 2d 1032 (Ala. Civ. App. 1992).
The payor spouse worked as a manual laborer in an automobile repair shop.
See ill. at 1033.
See ill.
See ill. The husband conceded that the shop employees did in fact perform
physical work in the shop, ranging from welding to painting to transmission
work. See ill.

278.
279.
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no marketable skills that would enable him to find sedentary
employment. 280
The court affirmed the trial court's decision that the payor
spouse was physically able to continue working in some alternative
capacity and that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in
modifying rather than terminating the husband's support payments. 281 The court's decision suggests that a thorough showing of
complete inability to perform any type of work may be necessary
before a court will terminate an alimony decree. 282

v.

CONCLUSION

As alimony payments are often the only means of survival for
the recipient spouse, strict criteria are needed in evaluating a
party's petition. No Maryland case to date has specifically set a precedent for terminating alimony payments for reasons other than
death or remarriage. As a result, it is reasonable to assume that
most future decisions by Maryland courts will be based on the analytical framework laid out in cases modifying alimony. Retirement is
a factor that surfaces repeatedly in alimony modification cases, but
is not always analyzed in a consistent fashion by each jurisdiction.
Petitions to modify alimony for changed circumstances due to retirement are likely to surface with greater frequency as the divorce
rate of couples hovers around fifty percent283 and the percentage of
American's reaching the age of retirement is expected to increase
until the year 2030. 284
280. See itt.
281. See itt.
282. See itt. In addition to examining the evidence presented, the trial court also

took into account the demeanor of both witnesses before reaching its conclusion that the husband was still employable. See itt.
283. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
284. See Jan Ellen Rein, Misinformation and Self-deception in Recent Long-term Care Policy Trends, 12 J. L. & POL. 195, 207 (1996). One commentator emphasizes
America's aging population phenomenon as follows:
Americans age sixty-five and over now outnumber the entire population of Canada, and they comprise 12.5% or more of the American
population, as compared to 4% in 1900. The aging of the baby-boom
generation, healthier lifestyles, and advances in medical technology
all have contributed to this explosive growth in the elderly population. This increase, described as an "age wave," will not begin to decline until the year 2030.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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Retirement, in good faith, is accepted in some jurisdictions as a
sufficient change in circumstances to warrant modification of alimony.28S On the other hand, many other jurisdictions do not consider retirement grounds for modifying an award. 286 Instead, they
look to any alternate income potential or earning capacity to sustain
the original award.287 Although voluntary retirement at an advanced
age does not automatically entitle a payor spouse to a reduction in
alimony payments, it is undeniable, from a social perspective, that
people plan their lives around the goal of retiring at the approximate age of sixty-five.288
Maryland does not have a solid foundation of case law on
which to analyze the issue of retirement, if it is ever confronted.
This challenging issue in domestic law yet to be definitively resolved, will eventually confront the judiciary, thereby forcing the
courts to choose which position they will support. The balancing
test, established by the Deegan court, lays a clear framework for a
court's analysis and would provide instructive guidance for Maryland courts. 289 This test appears to allow a court to thoroughly analyze the i~ue in its attempt to reach a fair and equitable result.
Colleen Marie Halloran

285. For a discussion of decisions finding that retirement in good faith warrants a
modification in spousal support obligations of the payor spouse, see supra
notes 181-200 and accompanying text.
286. For a discussion of decisions finding that retirement in and of itself is not a
sufficient ground to reduce or terminate alimony obligations, see supra notes
134-50, 200-11 and accompanying text.
287. For decisions pertaining to earning capacity after retirement as a method for
calculating reductions or modifications in spousal support obligations, see
supra notes 138-50 and accompanying text.
288. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
289. For a discussion of the balancing test implemented in the New Jersey decision
of Deegan v. Deegan, 603 A2d 542 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992), and its subsequent application in other jurisdictions, see supra notes 213-37 and accompanying text.

